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Abstract 
Resurrecting Eden:  
Inaugural British Narration and Policy of Iraq !
Timothy Kennett !
The American University in Cairo 
under the supervision of Dr. Walid Kazziha !
 This thesis examines Britain’s use of technology in developing Mesopotamia. British 
imaginations of Mesopotamia as Eden or El Dorado, reified by a multiplicity of travel literature, 
archeological digs, and geographic societies, formed the first half of a violent dialectic that 
granted divine right and responsibility to the British. Instead, colonialists claimed that 
Mesopotamia’s inhabitants squandered its primordial potential through neglect and 
mismanagement. These justifications fueled British attempts to develop Mesopotamia, irrigation 
engineers designing floodgates for the Tigris and Euphrates while agriculturalists created new 
strains of wheat that would flourish in its climate. But technology was more than development. It 
formed the foundation of a polemic leading to prolonged aerial bombardment and discipline; if 
modernism could resurrect the Garden, airplanes would tend and cultivate it. Therefore, the value 
of aircraft was not restricted to its ability for disciplining a population. Planes were physical 
manifestations of the British colonial project, flying articulations of the modern that sanctioned 
violence against the “primitive.” They were the latest mechanisms to embody the narrative of 
English supremacy and the latest conversation topics in British high society. !
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About the Documents and Comments Concerning Methodology 
 This thesis incorporates a large quantity of documents available at the British National 
Archives in Kew. A comprehensive list of archives used can be found in the bibliography. Most 
documents were either found from the Royal Air Force Archive (AIR) or the Colonial Office 
(CO). War Office (WO) and Foreign Office (FO) documents informed this thesis to lesser 
degree, as the Colonial Office was located in India during the period of the Mesopotamia 
Expeditionary Force and the War Office, located in London, was primarily responsible for the 
administration of the British Army rather than Air Force. During the MEF, the Royal Air Force 
was known as the Royal Flying Corps, part and parcel to the War Office. However, near the end 
of the First World War the RFC merged with the Royal Naval Air Service forming a new, distinct 
branch of the military. In many ways, the reorganization of Her Majesty’s forces represents the 
philosophical schism of military doctrine that would have profound and long-lasting effects on 
Iraq’s (mis)management. 
 AIR is a collection of documents containing immense amounts of correspondence, maps, 
memorandum, financial records, and intercepted telegraphs. However, operation records were 
most prolific. Operation records are brief reports detailing daily activities of the Royal Air Force. 
For example, if pilots attacked a village in Northern Iraq, the location, number of planes, target, 
and amount of bombs and small arms ammunition used, were painstakingly recorded. Portions of 
the archive are organized thematically, however, the vast majority has been collated by year and 
administrative unit. To go through the entire AIR archive would have been impossible. 
 Secondly are the memoirs and travelogues created by British adventurists and political 
elites who lived, worked, and fought in the region. These sources are meticulously detailed, 
!6
many of whiter were recorded by British officers (contemporaries of T.E. Lawrence). Particularly 
noteworthy is C.J. Edmonds memoir, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs, in my estimation the best primary 
source of southern Kurdistan in the 1920s. E.B. Soane's and To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in 
Disguise; with Historical Notices of the Kurdish Tribes and the Chaldeans of Kurdistan and A.T. 
Wilson’s, 1917-20: A Clash of Loyalties, are also fantastic and requisite sources for any student 
of Iraq. As a source, their greatest strength was providing voice to archival sources that proved to 
be inexorably dry. 
 A third important source are the transcripts of lectures held by the Royal Geographic 
Society and the Royal Central Asian Society. Distinguished colonial administrators, 
archeologists, geographers, and engineers composed a highly exclusive society that acted as a 
sort of brain-trust. These meetings articulated the narrative of the British colonial enterprise in 
ways that archival sources and travelogues did not. 
 Several images were provided by the Aerial Photographic Archive for Archaeology in the 
Middle East (APAAME) and the San Diego Air and Space Archives. APAAME is a project led 
by Oxford University and The University of Western Australia containing thousands of aerial 
archeology and bombing photographs. Indeed, some of Mesopotamia’s earliest images were 
those of archeological sites. This is particularly significant. The historical and cultural conditions 
are not inconsequential; Iraq became a prototype for aerial archeology and large-scale aerial 
policing. 
 Methodologically, I was uncertain where to begin or what my research would reveal. I 
roughly knew that my timeframe would center around the period of the Paris Peace Conference 
of 1919 and the Cairo Conference of 1921. Because I had a limited time and budget (and was 
!7
extremely ill), I merely dove in and waded through the plethora of British documents that 
comprise the National Archives in Kew, slowing navigating through vast quantities of paper and 
photographing those of interest. In the end, I collected several thousand images, mostly 
comprising security and intelligence reports from a wide variety of sources ranging from 
mundane operational records to the pen of Gertrude Bell. 
 Only after I organized, collated, and re-read my sources did I begin understanding them. 
Each type of document provided a unique perspective that complimented others. Even the 
prosaic nature of RAF operational records gave valuable insight concerning British intentions 
and their colonial mentality. Through the eyes of the British, I grew to understand colonizer and 
colonized. My research forced me to reevaluate the direction of my thesis and the original 
research questions: If Iraq was contrived, its political boundaries resisting reasonable contours of 
human geography, how had they remained coalesced? Furthermore, how is Iraq a product of a 
postwar modernity and to what degree?   1
 Certainly, the AIR archive attested to the importance of aircraft throughout the Mandate 
period, but I recognized it as a piece (albeit vast) of a larger story. The language and attitudes of 
the colonial brain-trust, comprised of geographers, archeologists, historians, administrators, and 
intelligence officers, indicated such. The construction of the Royal Air Force and their use of 
aircraft was a narrative of power, a dialectic part and parcel to larger colonial schemes of 
oppression. Planes epitomized the modern era, and the modern was antithetical to British 
imaginaries of Mesopotamian barbary. Thus, Iraq was the product of a strange amalgamation of 
!8
 With the assumption that the Sykes-Picot agreement was a shallow understanding of the historical and 1
cultural forces composing Iraq.
ingredients: cultural memory, deconstructive imaginaries, technological innovation, and brute 
force.  
 The greatest limitation of my Masters Thesis is the lack of Arab voice. Historian Dr. 
Priya Satia makes note of this, writing: 
 The actual experiences of Iraqis caught in the web of aerial surveillance have not, to my   
 knowledge, been described at any length and seem a pressing topic for examination by a   
 Middle East historian. This article is concerned with the logic of British justifications for   
 the air control regime, particularly the source of Briton’s confidence in their ability to   
 speak for the Arab, whatever the latter’s expression of protest or approval.  2!
Taking this to heart, I endeavored to incorporate subaltern voices to the best of my abilities but 
encountered many obstacles. First and foremost was the dearth of available material written in 
Arabic about British technological or aerial schemes. This exists for many reasons, not least of 
which was the Iraqi and Kurdish literary landscape and the predominance of oral tradition. 
Accentuating this phenomena was the stark reality that nomadic tribes formed the foundation of 
resistance against British colonial rule, their accounts are even less conspicuous. The second 
limitation is my ignorance of Kurdish, although I am uncertain how much this would have 
helped. The third chapter of this thesis examines aerial campaigns in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly 
close to Sulaimaniyah. However, Sulaimaniyah was far from the being the cultural capital of 
Kurdistan that it is today. During the 1920’s it was a rather unremarkable town of approximately 
ten thousand inhabitants, one hundred fifty of whom were gunsmiths who could make high 
!9
 Satia, Priya. "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia." The   2
American Historical Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 18.
quality imitations of the British Martini-Peabody carbine. Thus, it was not the cultural capital it 
is today.  3
 But I had some success, albeit limited. The Foreign Office contained a few Arab sources, 
but were generally limited to treaties or correspondence between colonial administrators and ‘Ibn 
Saud or some other elite. Some reports were made by normal villagers acting as informants for 
the British, particularly concerning events surrounding Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniyah. 
Furthermore, the library at AUC located an Arabic memoir in Iraq written by a leader of the 1920 
revolt and obtained it for me.  4
 I consciously used the terms “Iraqi” and “Mesopotamia” interchangeably for particular 
reasons. First, and most superficially, because it was a simple literary method for breaking the 
monotony and repetition that would inherently occur from using a single phrase. Second and 
more importantly, the British used both terms interchangeably.  In the beginning, I toyed with 5
writing this entire thesis without using the term, “Iraq.” I quickly realized how the idea of 
Mesopotamia, a “Western” term the British used, was equally imagined - if not more so. In fact, 
this became a problem during the Armistice of Mudros of 1918 when ‘Ali Ihsan Pasha agreed to 
evacuate Turkish troops from “Mesopotamia” only to settle in the city of Mosul.  6
!10
 Edmonds, C. J. Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel, and Research in North-eastern Iraq,   3
1919-1935. London: Oxford University Press, 1957: 79-80. Mark Sykes ventured through the town in 
1902, estimating that of its approximate ten thousand inhabitants, there were 750 Jews and 120 Chaldean 
Christians.
 Al-Bazirkan, ʻAli. Al-Waqai' al-Haqiqiyah fi al-Hawrah al-ʻIraqiyah : Risalah Tataḍammanu   4
Munaqashah wa Tahlil li Hawadith Thawrat al-ʻIraq fi 30 Huziran 1920 wa Rad ma Ulṣiqa bi ha min 
Muftarayat wa Tashih ma Dara Hawlaha min Akhtaʼ. 2nd ed. Baghdad, 1991. 
 Wilson, Arnold T. Mesopotamia, 1917-20: A Clash of Loyalties. London: Oxford University Press, 5
1931: 22.
 Lyon, Wallace A., and D. K. Fieldhouse. Kurds, Arabs & Britons: the Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, 6
1918-44. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002: 64
Introduction and Background 
 An enterprising London paper recently offered a prize of £1,000 for the best exposition of the 
Einstein theory, limited to 3,000 words. In undertaking to lecture for an hour on Mesopotamia, I have 
undertaken a scarcely less difficult task.  7
~ A.T. Wilson 
 British and Indian narratives described Mesopotamia as the land ‘between rivers’ or the 
fertile crescent. In the wake of post-War disillusionment, the British saw Mesopotamia as a new 
proving ground, the patient Eden waiting for the British to resurrect her by means of 
modernization and development. It was both a space to be redeemed and offer redemption.  8
These tropes, namely descriptions of the land as barren, biblical connections, and the saving 
grace of technology and development, fueled British and Indian imaginaries of Mesopotamia. 
Such narratives were not innocuous but rather represented a particular historical moment.  
Timothy Mitchell writes, “Objects of analysis do not occur as natural phenomena, but are partly 
formed by the discourse that describes them. The more natural the object appears, the less 
obvious this discursive manufacture will be.”  In this way, commonplace descriptions of regional 9
or Iraqi geographies, both physical and human, cannot be seen as self-evident but rather as 
processes of deformation and reconstruction.  
!11
 Wilson, Arnold. "Mesopotamia, 1914–1921." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 8, no. 3 7
(1921): 145.
 Satia, Priya. "Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First 8
World War." Past & Present 197, no. 1 (November 2007): 211-55.
 Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of 9
California Press, 2002: 210.
 The latter half of this dialectic, “sets up the object of development as just that - an object, 
not a part of the study but external to it.”  In this way, historians have until recently 10
underemphasized the the role of technology in nineteenth-century imperialism. However, if we 
accept imperialism as the result of “appropriate motives and adequate means,” we have a 
productive point of departure.  Timothy Mitchell, Priya Satia, and Juan Cole are a few who have 11
drawn focus on the tools of empire. 
 This thesis attempts to capture elements of those state-building processes through the 
purview of aerial discipline, attempting to answer why Iraq was deemed suitable for such 
Foucaultian tactics. This paper argues that Iraq became a space where geographic imaginaries 
and discourses of technology intersected leading to the first large-scale aerial policing in history, 
a precedent which can be felt today with the continued violation of vertical sovereignty 
throughout the Global South.  It would be impossible to understand Iraq within the guise of a 12
singular framework as Wilson’s epigraph suggests. Colonial administration, interagency strife 
between the India Office, Colonial Office, War Office, and RAF, and the shifting aims of the 
British Mandate, were all factors in shaping Iraq as a complex, and more often then not, 
bewildering space.  
 Specifically, the India Office directed policy for the first two years until the War Office 
took control over military affairs and the Foreign Office, based in Cairo, over policy. Under the 
supervision of the FO, Mark Sykes led the Arab Bureau, an intelligence agency consisting of 
!12
 Ibid.10
 Headrick, Daniel R. "The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial 11
Empires in the Nineteenth Century." The Journal of Modern History 51.2 (1979): 234.
 Williams, Alison. "Hakumat Al Tayarrat: The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraq's 12
Boundaries." Geopolitics 12, no. 3 (May 31, 2007): 507.
personalities such as T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell. However, the India Office maintained 
control over the Civil Administration in Iraq.  
Vague Objectives 
 Dialogue amongst colonial elites did not question the raison d’être of colonial campaign 
in Mesopotamia but rather its ability to protect the interests of the British Empire. The primary 
objective of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force (MEF) was originally the securitization of 
Iraq’s southern delta for two reasons. Britain’s first aim was establishing a “British Buffer State 
system,” a sort of catch-all phrase which extended from Peshawar to the North-West frontier of 
Afghanistan to the Caspian sea, then towards Egypt.  Mesopotamia cushioned India by 13
providing territorial insurance while a military presence allowed India to protect its interests 
against the Turks, Persians, Germans, and Russians. Secondly, Basra was a vital port that 
connected the Persian Gulf with India. Additionally, railroads in Mesopotamia were vital 
communication and transportation networks that connected the rest of the Empire together.  14
 However, after a quick and decisive victory in the wali of Basra, British and Indian 
officers quickly turned their sites upon Baghdad. However, this force had not prepared for the 
military demands required for a long-term campaign to Baghdad, evidenced by the devastating 
defeat the MEF encountered at Kut. As Sluglett notes, “the speed with which the original 
!13
 Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918): 13
3. This was the first time I encountered such terminology, however, Lieut.-Colonel Yate uses it freely and 
liberally, suggesting that this reference may be more pervasive. Western China could be included here as 
well. In fact, the Royal Central Asian society held a  discussion about the the Mohammadian Question in 
Western China. 
 Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918): 14
3-10.
objectives enlarged is remarkable.”  The “expansion” of “administrative machinery,” 15
particularly the establishment of a civil administration within the Basra wali was counter to the 
narrative London and General John Nixon, Townshend’s superior, purported earlier.  If the 16
original objective had been Basra, why advance past Amara, never mind Cteiphon, Kut, or 
Baghdad? However, Nixon should have prepared British and Indian forces for an extended 
campaign if Baghdad had been their aim.  This was because the objective had never been 17
clearly communicated and Mesopotamia’s importance to the empire remained abstract. Colonel 
A.C. Yate commented on this ambiguity:  
 I have studied with care the words and acts of the Cabinet in London and the Government  
 at Simla, and I have come to the conclusion that not a man in authority, since Lord   
 Kitchener left India, had any conception what a campaign against the Turks in    
 Mesopotamia really meant.  18!
In a frank address to the British War Cabinet, P. de B. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations 
in Mesopotamia wrote, “…I wish to point out that whatever the reasons for our occupation of 
Mesopotamia and Persia may be - and the British taxpayer may be pardoned for wanting to know 
what he is getting for his 20 or 30 millions a year - it is not for any military reason that we are 
there.”  19
 Despite Yate’s criticisms of the MEF, he still believed the Berlin-Baghdad railway and 
policy of Drang mach Osten or eastward expansion was the greatest external threat to India’s 
!14
 Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932. New York: Columbia UP, 15
2007. 9.
 Ibid.16
 Barker, 17
 Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918): 18
9.
 FO 371/5232, Memorandum, The Situation in Mesopotamia, by General P. de B. Radcliffe with 19
covering note by Rt Hon. W.S. Churchill, 7 December, 1920. This was the only document I found that 
contained a divergent perspective on the colonial project in Iraq. 
security.  In addition to the Baghdad-Berlin railway, another route from “Hamburg-Herat” was 20
proposed to further cement German economic interests with India. In his book India in 
Transition: A Study in Political Evolution published in 1918, His Highness Agha Khan argued 
that Germany’s foreign interests threatened Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan; therefore, Britain 
had an obligation to protect and develop these territories. 
 With this in mind, this thesis is not a comprehensive endeavor to explain why Iraq is the 
way it is,  but intervenes to emphasize a particular layer and narrative - namely the role of 21
technology in “resurrecting" the biblical landscape propagated by the British colonial project. 
Fundamentally, this thesis utilizes a framework developed previously by Stanford Historian Priya 
Satia and must be emphasized more in the general conceptions and historiography of Iraq, 
“Existing historiography does not explain satisfactorily why Iraq in particular was deemed a 
suitable place for such practices.”  Each chapter aims to be less abstract than the previous, 22
progressing from a narrative of biblically to the brutal tactics of aerial bombardment, attempting 
to show the existing articulations, links, and narratives permitting such behavior.  
 The first chapter picks up at the end of the 19th century, referring to documentation that 
formed the Biblical narrative manufactured by engineers, scholars, and officers. It continues 
through the years of 1914-18 when the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force fought the Turkish 
General ‘Ali Ihsan Pasha from Basra to Baghdad and the Western Powers were entrenched in 
Europe. In its initial phase, the MEF was led by India as the British were primarily focused on 
!15
 Ibid, 11. 20
 Although, this primitive question certainly lies at the foundation of my inquiry. Historians and political 21
scientists have wrestled with this question since Iraq’s creation, even remaining with prominent Iraqi 
historian Hanna Batatu until his death.
 Satia, Priya. "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia." The American 22
Historical Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 16.
their campaign in Western Europe. In theory, the primary objective had been the securing of 
Basra’s port. However, the MEF continued to march north after experiencing early victory. 
However, after a brilliant maneuver by ‘Ali Ihsan, these initial successes were short-lived as the 
Turks besieged a beleaguered and undersupplied force led by General Thomson. At this point, 
both the Turks and Brits had endured two devastating defeats - the British at Kut and Gallipoli 
and the Turks at Suez and Sarikamish, each side experiencing extensive losses. 
 The Turks were not the only nation whom the British were solicitous with. The political 
situation in Russia was dubious and remained a concern for the British throughout their 
campaign. Lenin had taken control and Russian troops formed at the British flanks, however, 
their intentions in the region were ubiquitous.  
 Fundamentally, Mesopotamia was a land at the mercy of three declining empires - the 
Ottomans, the Russians, and the Persians, and the envy of three European nations- the French, 
the British, and the Germans. In 1916, Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot negotiated a 
secret agreement now known as Sykes-Picot, prematurely dividing Arabia into separate artificial 
spaces - Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate and Iraq under the British Mandate, with 
Mosul mostly in the French zone.  Of course, Iraq today is most unlike the Iraq envisioned by 23
Mark Sykes, an individual T.E. Lawrence described: 
 Then there was the imaginative advocate of unconvincing world-movements, Mark Sykes: also a  
 bundle of prejudices, intuitions, half-sciences. His ideas were of the outsides; and he lacked  
 patience to test his materials before choosing his style of building. He would take an aspect of the 
 truth, detach it from its circumstances, inflate it, twist and model it, until its old likeness and its  
 new unlikeness together drew a laugh; and laughs were his triumphs.  24!
!16
 After the Armistice of Mudros, the British occupied Mosul. The French were unhappy after the 23
discovery of oil and an agreement was made, splitting oil revenue roughly 75-25 to the British.
 T.E Lawrence, Seven Pillars Of Wisdom: A Triumph (London: Vintage Books, 2008), pg. 57.24
Despite their occupation, many of their original designs were based on Ottoman maps. Vast 
cadres of linguists, agriculturalists, and academics comprised the RGS, RCAS, and Cairo Office 
for many years. The ever popular narrative of Iraq’s artificiality suggests the country was 
designed by several overworked and unpaid interns on a Friday afternoon. 
 The second chapter, “Technology as Development: British Visions and the Value of 
Mesopotamia,” highlights the structural shifts of the British Empire after the First World War. 
The British developed Mesopotamia from two different perspectives. First as British and Indian 
cultural imaginations perceived the natural or innate characteristics of Mesopotamia  - a Biblical 
garden from time immemorial that could be cultivated to support humanity.  Thus, cultural 25
imagination was not innocuous. Rather, the Civil Administration articulated these notions within 
public policy, evident by the presence of irrigation engineers and agriculturalists. But Iraq 
exhibited external or structural value to the Empire. Within an atmosphere of monetary 
constraints, evolving technology, and a unique geographical space (a buffer zone for India), 
Mesopotamia furnished the empire with a territory perfectly suitable to link the colonies by air 
while affirming a dialectic of superiority by means of modernity. 
 The third chapter, titled “Technology as Discipline: How Airplanes Disciplined Shaikh 
Mahmud,” focuses on a formative period of Kurdish and Iraqi history that is simply 
underemphasized. The Cairo Conference of 1922 marked a severe policy shift for the British in 
Mesopotamia, namely transferring military operations from the War Office to the Royal Air 
Force because of monetary constraints and improving technological advances. This shift had far 
reaching consequences and was the final articulation of technological and military superiority. 
!17
 Parfit, J. T. Mesopotamia: The Key to the Future. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917.25
Thus, in light of the previous chapters, the RAF was not just an administrative body but a 
materialized a particular understanding of the colonial project (themselves) and temperament 
towards Iraq (others). For the first time in human history, extended aerial policing was used to 
quench the Arab Revolt of 1920 and Shaikh Mahmud, a Kurdish agha from Sulaimaniyah who 
was aided by informal Turkish forces until 1925. While the Lausanne Conference began in 
September 1922, both Turkey and Britain waged a proxy war that engulfed the entire North-West 
Frontier. More than an interrogation of colonial power, this chapter is a history attempting to 
fulfill voids in secondary literature by highlighting the figure of Shaikh Mahmud, who 
proclaimed himself “King of Kurdistan” and was instrumental in forming a Kurdish nationalism.  
!
!
!
!
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Technology as Divine: How a Biblical Dialectic Rendered ‘Iraq !
“There is a story that Eve, when she left, wept copiously and that her tears grew into the bush, which was still 
growing prolifically on the Mesopotamian front. The berries on it were known as ‘Eve’s tears.’  26
~ British and Indian troops referred to Amara as, ‘The Garden of Tears.’ !
 The meanings of “Iraq” and “Mesopotamia” were ambiguous in the early 20th century. 
Sykes-Picot and a plethora of other designs outlined its physical boundaries, but few were in 
agreement. Turkish and British generals would witness the effects of such ambiguity firsthand. 
Ottoman records never used the term “Mesopotamia,” a Greek word translating to “[Land] 
Between Two Rivers.” However, British travelers and orientalists had used it with regularity for 
over a century. 
 Furthermore, as the initial campaign of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force 
(1914-1918) shifted its sights northward, away from the objective to secure the port of Basra and 
towards Baghdad, the geography and administrative districts of Iraq morphed thereby distorting 
the definition of “Iraq” further. The Ottomans governed Iraq as three separate wilayets, Basrah, 
Baghdad, and Mosul. When the Ottoman Empires and the Allies signed the Armistice of Mudros, 
‘Ali Ihsan Pasha signed an agreement with the British War Office that he would evacuate 
Mesopotamia and all hostilities would cease by noon on October 31st, 1918. However, he 
evacuated to Mosul with the understanding that Mosul was a separate region than Mesopotamia 
and hostilities nearly broke out on November 7th when the British delivered an ultimatum to ‘Ali 
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Pasha to leave or else be eradicated.  Effectively, British troops occupied Mosul illegally, 27
forever disrupting its regional commercial and social geographies.  28
 Of course, such confusion was not limited to physical locations but interfered with the 
conceptions of “who” constituted as Iraqi, a discussion that never became passé and became 
particularly poignant with the British evacuation of Sulaimaniyah in 1922.  Colonial records 29
reflected such uncertainty, the RAF labeling operations under headlines such as “The Kurdish 
Question,” or the “Mosul Question.”  Referencing the “Kurdish Question,” in a lecture at the 30
Royal Central Asian Society six years after operations began near the Iraq-Iran border, the 
former Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson said, “It is, of course, a very difficult thing to 
fix a frontier in a region like that. Administrative officers are inclined to extend their functions: 
no one quite knows where the frontier is.” Thus, when Kurdish refugees began flooding to Erbil 
and Tikrit, the British Civil Administration wrestled with the applicability of the Iraqi election 
law and ideas of self-determination - a question that continues to resurface until today. A 
telegraph from the Foreign Office dating January 31st, 1922, reads, “I [am] not quite clear what 
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is implied of reference to ambiguity of word, “Iraqi,” and nature of risks involved, and requests 
explanation.”  31
 So how did the British imagine Mesopotamia, a region imbued with as much 
nomenclature as there are people groups? British narratives of the Orient can be traced back to 
the early 19th century when affluent English travelers, often steeped with a knowledge of Latin, 
Ancient Greek, and the histories of Herodotus, recorded their adventures in numerous memoirs. 
The descriptive nature of these works are imbued with the illustrations of landscapes and fauna, 
sketched maps, and encounters with the Orient. But such positivism did not lie dormant but set 
into motion newfound cultural understandings and imaginations.  Thus, narrations of the Orient 32
were not innocuous but rather instrumental in rendering Palestine and Iraq as Biblical, first as 
sites of intrigue, and later as justifications for British and Indian statecraft in Mesopotamia.    
 The danger of such cultural discourses were real. Bell, Soane, Lawrence, Stark, Wilson 
and numerous others who travelled Palestine, Persia, and Mesopotamia, intertwined racial 
discourse throughout their writings, not just of the Arab but the Kurd, Assyrian, Yezedi, 
Turkoman, Armenian, and others.  The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) and Royal Central 33
Asian Society (RCAS) were composed of an intimate network of colonial administrators, 
geographers, engineers, and officers. Both served as an open and multidisciplinary space to 
exchange knowledge and updates on expeditions and campaigns.  
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 Bell and Lawrence, along with many other British personnel, made Akaba to Aden 
legible with a myriad of scientific feats - botany, cartography, and topography to name a few. 
With an audience at the RGS, the Keeper of Antiquities at the British Museum, D.G. Hogarth 
gave a lecture titled War and Discovery in Arabia. Lectures focusing on the archeological 
exploits in conjunction with the military endeavors of the British military in Mesopotamia were 
commonplace in the RGS and RCAS forums. In his lecture, Hogarth praises British efforts to 
survey the territory between Akaba and Yeden between 1916-19; no longer was it the land of 
“terra incognita” as he affectionately called it.  He also described how Lawrence referred to the 34
Nefud steppe as “el-Hul,” or a “barren void” that lacked any animal life or vegetation.   35
 Consequentially, these individuals imbued their descriptions with geographic 
determinism, ascertaining how the physical environment shaped the minds and personalities of 
Mesopotamia. From Orientalism, “Now this attempt would have been impossible had it not also 
been believed - in classical empiricist terms - that mind and body were interdependent realities, 
both determined originally by a given set of geographical, biological, and quasi-historical 
conditions.”   36
 More broadly, these geographical and quasi-historical elements are reflected in the 
didactic literature of J.T. Bannister’s, A Survey of the Holy Land; Its Geography, History, and 
Destiny which was published in 1844. His purpose was to address increased demand of biblical 
evidence with “Sacred Geography and History,” which would “elucidate the sense and display 
the beauties of the Sacred Text.” He did this without visiting Palestine or Mesopotamia, writing 
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this voluminous work on the experiences of other orientalists. Believers would benefit by 
experiencing the Bible, either personally or through the memoirs of other travelers: 
 With how much greater impression shall we read the narrative of the location of our first   
 parents in Paradise, of the events which happened to them there, and their expulsion from  
 it, when in your imagination, we can fix on a spot in the map of the earth, and say, ‘There  
 all these occurrences took place.’ With how much greater impression shall we read the   
 story of the Deluge and, when we readily recur to the country where the ark was built,   
 can follow its course, from the point where it began to float to that which it rested, when   
 the waters retired from it; !!
Bannister’s work represented a growing trend and fascination among Western authors, 
particularly the British, with Biblical historicity in the late 19th century. This sentimentality  
continued through the 1920s but diverged from archiving to cultivating.  
 An irrigation engineer known as Sir William Willcocks was excited about Mesopotamia’s         
commercial prospects in 1903 and made preliminary designs for improving its waterways. The 
Foreign Office had been dubious about the engineer’s claims about its potential, but by 1904 a 
third-party supported his assertions and Willcocks had preliminary irrigation designs drawn by 
1905.  Willcocks published a tantalizing account of his experiences surveying Mesopotamia in 37
1909 in a lecture at the Royal Geographical Society.  Along with his colleagues at the RGS, 38
Willcocks spent a considerable amount of time theorizing about the exact location of the Garden 
of Eden. Colonel F.R. Maunsell asserted that Eden was most likely found east of Elam in the  
!
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southwestern Persian province of Pusht-i-Kuh while Willcocks was inclined to believe that its 
location lay near the juncture of the Euphrates and Tigris, near Kurna or Amara.  He also 40
concluded that the poplar wood found in the Euphrates valley and was the same used by Noah to 
build his ark.  In fact, the irrigation engineer was so confident and faithful in the ability of 41
modern technology, he proclaimed, “If Noah had been a hydraulic engineer, he would have 
constructed the Pison river escape instead of an ark, and saved not only his family but his 
country as well.”  42
 Iraq was continuously imagined as a timeless space. Such articulations teemed 
throughout the travelogues of English pilgrims, never becoming passé but rather fetishizing and  
thus, reifying the human and physical geographies of the region. In his return from a diplomatic 
mission from Persia 1834, James Baillie Fraser visited numerous towns and cities throughout 
Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. Besides commenting on their customs, dress, and hospitality, he 
commented mercilessly on tribal personalities and characteristics, using terms like “creature,” 
“dwarf,” or “monkey.”  Where many inhabitants failed to develop the region or use basic 43
farming tools such as ploughs, it became a reflection of their character and supported the notion 
that time moved more slowly and spaces were empty and unpopulated.  Heude, Porter, Rich, 44
Groves, Mignan, and Fraser, all travelers of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia in the early 19th 
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century, were all complicit in establishing a discourse which continued throughout the mandate 
era.   45
 Canon J.T. Parfit, known by as his friends as “the Rural Dean of the Garden of Eden,” 
was a parish priest living in Mesopotamia and the turn of the 20th century.  In 1917 he 46
published a work Mesopotamia: The Key to the Future organized in sections titled: Its Ancient 
Glories, Its Dreary Desolation, and Its Future Prospects. He writes fondly about the region’s 
ancient past and contributions to civilization - weights and measures, astronomy, and 
mathematics. In the tradition of past writers, he evokes imagery from the Hebrew Scriptures, 
citing such locations and events as: “Nimrod,” “the Flood,” and the “plain of Shinar [and] the 
Confusion of Tongues.”  He soon contrasts Mesopotamia’s past glory with its current state of 47
neglect, inhabited by impoverished persons who fail to cultivate the land. Frogs, insects, 
scorpions, and centipedes were so bountiful he contended, “Mesopotamia is now the ideal 
entomologists’ paradise.”  48
 The exploits of Major E.B. Soane, who first began working for the Imperial Bank of 
Persia in 1902 and later for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, are well documented in his memoir, 
Through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise.  He ventured into Kurdistan as a Persian 49
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returning to Shiraz after living in Europe.  In his travels to the Zab Rivers north of Mosul as a 50
Captain, E.B. Soane refers to Genesis 10, “And Cush begat Nimrod: he began to be a mighty one 
on the earth…Out of that land went forth Asshur, and builded Nineveh, and the city of Rehoboth, 
and Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and Calah: the same is a great city,” while previously 
mentioning the “hordes of savage people” who continue to inhabit the lands near the Zagros 
Mountains.   51
 In 1921, then president of the RGS, Francis Younghusband reflected that if the oriental 
was not ignorant, he was lazy for not taking advantage of the resources available to him in the 
desert.  The Geographical Journal’s publication “The Influence of Nature on Japanese 52
Character,” in 1924 further illustrates notions of geographic determinism that spread to the Far 
East and continued far later than the early exploits of the first English explorers.  
 Traveler and journalist Freya Stark who travelled the Hakkiari Mountains by herself in 
1931 made several journey’s through Mosul, Hamarra, and Baghdad, waylaying at ancient sites 
of civilization and touring the stories of the Bible.   These later dates are important and 53
demonstrate how compelling the Biblical narrative proved to be, despite Britain’s more concrete 
security and commercial policies after the Great War. She commonly visited the tombs of past 
characters, such as Job in Nineveh or Esther and Mordecai’s in Persia. From these influences, she 
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wrote about Iraq’s primordial past and the timeless character the region possessed. Indeed, she 
wrote, “Mounds of buried villages float above the mists like islands, and the horizon melts in 
dust to the south. Stubble blows loose in autumn over undulations whose wheat or barley once 
enriched the black-bearded Assyrians, and here the flocks move from morning to evening in their 
migrations, with one shepherd ahead of them and one behind them, under the clinging discomfort 
of their own dust.”  Such descriptions were commonplace, relocating Mesopotamia within the 54
timeless and mythological annals of ancient literature such as Nights of Arabia.   55
 Not only did these descriptions of the Orient position populations as primitive, they were 
the first half of a dialectic that justified British interventionism. After numerous decades of 
observing and archiving their knowledge, British colonialists commenced land surveys and 
archeological excavations throughout the Shatt al-Arab. Commenting on a lecture presented by 
A.T. Wilson, Paleographer and Biblical Scholar, Sir Frederic G. Kenyon said, “I should like to 
say that if we take up the responsibility for a country like Mesopotamia or Palestine, we assume 
a responsibility for its past history as well as its present and future.”  In this way, the British 56
aristocracy took it upon themselves to safeguard the annals of history while simultaneously 
establishing their virtue. However, unique to Iraq rather than Palestine was it being Adam and 
Eve’s home, and thus the site of original sin. 
 Perhaps more importantly, such descriptions were essential in establishing the moral and 
civic superiority of the British. Control of “subject races” should be morally defensible for 
!28
 Stark, Freya. Riding to the Tigris (London: John Murray, 1959), 2-3.54
 Stark, Freya. Beyond Euphrates: Autobiography, 1928-1933. London: John Murray, 1951: 12, 116.55
 Wilson, Arnold. "Mesopotamia, 1914–1921." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 8, no. 3 56
(1921): 158. 
British Imperialism to spread. In fact, according to Lord Cromer, this was the “keystone” to 
imperial power. While the military was important for the general maintenance of the country, 
“deliberate oppression” or mismanagement would undo the Empire just as it had the Romans.  57
But the Brits had a secret weapon to combat egotism and other political maladies. Cromer writes, 
“Christianity is our most powerful ally.”  The Christian moral code should be spread throughout 58
the Empire if the British were to succeed. Thus, travelogues did much to establish imagery of a 
Biblical Eden waiting, even beckoning, to be saved by the masculine Empire. 
 But the British had more tools at their disposal than the stories of English travelers. With 
the capture of Baghdad in 1917, the British began archeological digs under the supervision of 
Captain R. Campbell Thompson, a prominent Assyriologist working as an intelligence officer.  59
He began work in Nasriyah and the city of Ur, where he discovered the foundations of E-
kharsag, Ê-makh, and a palace of the kings Ur-Nammu among others.  Another individual, Dr. 60
H. R. Hall from the British Museum began archaeological work in December 1918, “on behalf of 
the Civil Administration.” Besides visiting Nippur and Babylon, he assisted administration by 
creating regulations for the transport of antiquities.  His preliminary findings led to further 61
excavations in 1925 at the site of ‘Ur, co-led and funded by teams from the British Museum and 
the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania. 
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 Excavations such as these were not restricted to the confines of Mesopotamia but part and 
parcel to a larger colonial agenda to understand and revive the ancient glories of the past. As the 
British Empire expanded, so to did its archeological program, both historically and temporally.   
Said makes reference to British biblical narratives and the accession of the oriental framework, 
“Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars 
and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and 
Manu.”  So, while Mesopotamia offered new opportunities to reorient its efforts to reclaim the 62
sites of Genesis, it was also a space to further British preoccupations with the occult.   63
 To aid the efforts of the British Museum, the RAF used “air archeology” for the first time 
in Mesopotamia. One of the earliest instances occurred when Lieut.-Colonel G.A. Beazley led 
efforts to photograph and create a “six-inch survey” of the area surrounding Sammara.  64
Afterwards, surveyors would transfer the photographs to a plane-table and conduct ground 
surveys when necessary. These early efforts uncovered an ancient city that otherwise would have 
remained unnoticed. Additionally, topographers recognized a complex irrigation pattern in the 
landscape that further reinforced a narrative of Iraqi negligence and fall from glory. 
 Later, O.G.S. Crawford and Dr. Hogarth approached the RAF requesting that any 
photographs of archeological and geographical interest should be sent to the Society of 
Antiquities and Royal Geographical Society.  Consequently, Crawford obtained thousands of  65
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Palace of Hatra, seventy miles southwest of Mosul. Founded sometime during the reign of 
Trajan. City was destroyed by Shapur I of the Sassanid Dynasty.  66
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photo negatives from the RAF for analysis, such services typifying the symbiotic relationship 
between the military and antiquities department throughout the Mandate era. Corroborating the  
effectiveness of air photography to identify archeological sites, Percy Cox said, “I have for years 
known ground and been over it time after time without being able to recognize any system of 
irrigation or line of foundation which at once became obvious from the air.”  For this purpose,  67
surveyors conducted flights throughout the countryside, taking photos of sites such as Hatra, 
Nineveh, and Selecuia and unearthing points of interest which would, have otherwise, been 
unseen.  
 Sir O.G.S. Crawford, archeologist and pioneer of such practices concluded his lecture at 
the Royal Geographical Society stating: 
 The aeroplane, merely as a means of conveyance, is by far the best invention of man, for it is  
 swift, safe, and comfortable. As an instrument of archaeological research it is (with a camera)  
 second only to excavation, and sometimes even more effective. The photographs shown on the  
 screen - a selection only from 1700, the nucleus, I hope, of a great national collection - will  
 inaugurate a new epoch in oriental studies. The future of exploration, and not only of   
 archeological exploration, is literally in the air.  68!
As the airplane become an extension of the map with its ability to monitor populations 
“continuously” or “semi-continuously”  cartography allowed the British to perpetuate the 69
narrative of unchanging landscapes while simultaneously monitoring tribal movements. In fact,  
the Royal Geography Society (RGS) and Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS) 
maintained close relationships with Military Operations 4  and the Arab Bureau based in  70
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Cairo.  Both Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence worked intimately with the RGS for extended 71
periods of time. Bell often made corrections and comments on Middle East map sheets and  
Lawrence began his career under the tutelage of David George Hogarth, RGS Councilman and 
Keeper of Antiquities at the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford. In fact, it was Lawrence’s 1911 
journey to Damascus with Hogarth, allegedly under cover as an archeology trip but really an 
intelligence-gathering operating on the newly planned German railway to Baghdad, that sparked 
his interest in the Middle East.  It was also Hogarth who referenced the first aerial survey of 72
Medina, incorporating photographs in his research.  Truly, the plane could unravel the mysteries 73
of the Orient.  
 Air photography aided the map-making operations of the RGS and GSGS. Using newly 
decided stereoscopic plotting machines, an observer could take overlapping photos of the plane 
and using methods of triangulation, calculate the height and distance of either a monument or 
Turkish military fortifications. In this way, Mesopotamia represents a particular cultural moment 
for British colonialists and its use of aerial technology. With these newfound advances, British 
administrators, archeologists, and military strategists could test the abilities of air surveillance as 
both a method to monitor and render its history, land, and people. Concerning the relationship 
between scriptural geography and science, Aiken writes, “Science was seen as an undertaking 
which explained God’s created world, and privileged the place of God’s revealed truth in it.”  74
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By making the landscape legible, air technology and newly developed cartographic techniques 
unearthed the ancient glories of Iraq’s primordial past thereby reifying the supremacy of the 
modern and the frequent narrations of neglect written by British travelers and high society. 
 Three years after the conclusion of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force in 1918, the 
campaign fast became burdensome. The Royal Air Force had just suppressed the Arab Revolt of 
1920, setting precedent for the first extended aerial police action in human history. As Sir 
Michael O’Dwyer, perviously Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, stated, “At one time we were 
told Mesopotamia as an El Dorado, which would revive the ancient glories of Babylon and 
Baghdad; a few years more and the cold fit comes on, and we are told that Mesopotamia is a 
millstone round our necks, and that we must clear out at the first moment.”  The reference to 75
“millstone” is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a reference to Mark 9:42, Luke 17:2, or Matthew 
18:6, which reads, “And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in Me, it is 
better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.”  In 76
this way, even the campaign’s struggles were articulated both within a biblical and primordial 
framework. 
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Technology as Development: British Visions and the Value of Mesopotamia 
“I do not think it possible to imagine anything more like a practical paradise than the country 
near Asnah. Every tree and crop must have been familiar to Adam except the cotton crop.”  78
Willcocks, Irrigation Engineer !
 English travelers, British officers, and colonial administrators created vast collections of         
literature that emphasized Mesopotamia’s glorious past. It was the land of our Biblical 
forefathers and incubated the magnificent civilizations of old. But now it lay destitute and 
neglected by Turks and natives alike. If the first half of Britain’s dialectic created a sublime 
cultural imagination, the second part appealed to Mesopotamia’s potential. But it needed 
Britain’s help, “No government can be formed in the Middle East in these days without our 
support and assistance…” said High Commissioner A.T. Wilson.  Colonel A.C. Yate concluded 79
that the eastern portions of the British Empire, “stretching from the Shatt-el-Arab to the Suez 
Canal,” would fail without its “mistress” - Britain.  But the Empire offered the saving grace of 80
development and would restore the nation to rival - or even surpass - the achievements of its 
primordial civilizations.  
 However, such descriptions were not innocuous but rather formed the building blocks for         
colonial land management and population control. British colonialists saw Mesopotamia’s worth 
from two perspectives. First, was Mesopotamia’s worth as cultural imagination formed it. Thus, 
narratives of Eden and connections to past grandeur considerably influenced institutions like the 
Agricultural Development Scheme. For example, the ADS introduced new agricultural crops to 
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fulfill Mesopotamia’s natural destiny as the world’s garden or breadbasket (or the qualities that 
Britain saw to be innate or internal). A second perspective focused on the strategic importance of 
Mesopotamia within the external structural demands of the British Empire. These, of course, 
included rudimentary necessities like foodstuffs and oil, but then incorporated more complex 
abstractions like becoming an Indian thoroughfare. A British vicar stationed in Mesopotamia 
begins the third chapter of his monograph, “Mesopotamia: the Key to the Future,” with: 
 It is no exaggeration to say that the whole world’s peace, its progress, and prosperity hang            
 largely upon the settlement of the many problems associated with this unique country of            
 Mesopotamia. (1) The development of its natural resources is a matter of some importance to           
 multitudes (2) The reopening of its ancient highways and the construction of great trunk            
 railways to India and the Far East are matters of still greater importance, especially to the            
 inhabitants of the Eastern Hemisphere.           81!
While cultural imaginations fueled British interventionism, another reality was Iraq’s value as a 
resource-laden buffer-state that could, in theory, sustain itself and link London to Australia.  
The Prospects of Development and Mesopotamia’s “Natural” Characteristics 
 In 1909, irrigation engineer William Willcocks evaluated the watering systems of the         
Babylonians, attributing their prosperity to their ability to discipline nature, “From the 
Lamentations of Jeremiah we may gather that Mesopotamia in olden times was rich and 
prosperous, by reason of its irrigation works, and that it became ‘a desolation, dry, and a desert’ 
when a flood overwhelmed those works.”  The Tigris and Euphrates annually flooded the land 82
“from time immemorial.”  He asserted that the first priorities of any hydraulic engineer in 83
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Mesopotamia were to protect the region from flooding and reduce the quantity of silt in irrigation 
water. By Willcocks’ estimation, the Tigris and Euphrates carried four times as much sediment as 
the Nile, thus handicapping future prospects of agricultural development.  This concern proved 84
prophetic as the land around Baghdad flooded in 1915, preventing farmers from their sowing 
crops. Even in 1916 the ground remained too moist for crops.  85
 Willcocks proposed that engineers should construct flood gates on the Tigris and         
Euphrates. He estimated these water relief structures would cost an estimated £6,000,000. He 
boldly proclaimed at the Royal Geographical Society:  
 …[They] would by themselves double the value of every acre of land in the delta; be a            
 godsend to Baghdad and every other town and village; and allow the Baghdad railway to            
 traverse the cultivated land, and not, as at present proposed, cling to the deserts as Noah did           
 his ark. The engineers who aligned the railway have shown a timidity which would have cost           
 them their lives in the times of that arch-engineer Marduk or Nimrod. They have fled from            
 Tiamat.           86!
Accordingly, if such difficulties were overcome and managed, Mesopotamia could produce a 
million tons of wheat and twice that in cotton. However, even if such quantities could be grown, 
Willcocks wrote that merchants were concerned with their ability to move it, “Every merchant 
and man of business I have talked with in Baghdad is convinced of one thing, and that is what 
the backward state of the country is due in great part to the fact that while communication is 
open by river with the east, it is to the west that the whole produce of the country wants to find a 
way.”  Thus, he proposed the creation of a railroad which would connect the major 87
cosmopolitan areas, particularly those upstream from the port of Basra. This was known as 
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“Willcocks’ Scheme,” which would connect Baghdad and the Mediterranean through Hit and 
Homs.  88
 The imagery of the Garden of Eden and its relationship to agriculture was highly familiar 
to the Foreign Office. Said Archibald Sayce, Reverend and Chair of Assyriology at Oxford, in a 
lecture titled The Garden of Eden and Its Restoration, “You saw the pictures this evening - you 
saw the unirrigated land, and then you saw the irrigated. I visited both those sites, and that is just 
what you see. We want to acquire all the country between those two rivers, to make the whole 
length of it just one great productive garden.”  Additionally, the commonplace presence of 89
archeologists at RGS meetings which detailed colonial aspirations further demonstrates a strong 
marriage between cultural production and development. 
 Elements of geographic determinism, primordialism, and the ability of technology to 
govern nature are present elsewhere: 
 All history is largely dependent upon geography, but in no part of the world is that more   
 true than in the case of Babylonia. Babylonia was the gift of the rivers, and it was made   
 inhabitable by the irrigation works carried on in times which we now call prehistoric by   
 the earliest engineers of the country.  90!
The antiquated glories of Mesopotamia’s past were so pervasive in British society that Sir 
George Cunningham Buchanan, the eventual mastermind behind the reorganization of Basra’s 
port, wrote a four-part series in The Times berating British efforts to develop it. He challenged 
Mesopotamia’s romanticized image and questioned the motives of the British War Office; the 
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British would need incredible amounts of capital for the protection of people and property, 
establishing communications, heightening agricultural development, and increasing trade. He 
questioned the ambitious schemes of William Willcocks, arguing that engineers should 
strengthen the natural lines of the Tigris and Euphrates and irrigation restored incrementally.  91
However, far from a patron saint, Buchanan’s discord was rooted in general disdain for the 
territory rather than post-colonialist critique.  
Agriculture and Oil 
 In her memoir Forest Venture: Conquering the Deserts of the Middle East published in 
1960, Louis Maitland recalls her husband Victor Kennard comparing Middle Eastern terrain and 
soils, “Now Syria is quite different; it’s thinly populated and, from what I hear, there’s a lot of 
good land. Obviously it could support a much larger population if agriculture and industry were 
developed.”  Vic, who was a forestry and soil conservation adviser with the Development 92
Division of the British Middle East Office, praised the efforts of wheat, barley, and cotton 
production. 
 In 1919 the principal exports amounted to eleven million pound sterling, the majority of 
which came from dates, grain, and wool. A.T. Wilson saw value in developing Iraq as both an 
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exporter of agricultural and pastoral goods and as an emerging market for consumer goods such 
as British and Indian tea. He saw little or no potential in Iraq for manufacturing.  93
 When the British and Indian Expeditionary Force landed in Basra on November 6, 1914, 
taking charge of local governance shortly thereafter, they found the population to be without cash 
or credit for a variety of reasons. The Turks had left a highly disorganized system that proved 
ineffective and highly bureaucratic. Such inefficiencies along with a particularly poor date 
season exacerbated the abeyance of trade towards India and Baghdad.  94
 Cognizant of its success in Egypt, Mesopotamia’s Civil Administration was excited about 
the potential of cotton.  But Mesopotamia differed from Egypt. Large tracks of land remained 95
uncultivated throughout summer because of high salt, lime, and alkali content, issues less 
pronounced in Egypt. These decreased organic materials and nutrients in the soil. In response, 
agriculturalist and Major C.R. Wimshurst discovered that alfalfa and clover are attracted to lime 
and alkali; farmers would drastically increase organic levels if they plowed these plants under the 
soil before sowing cotton seeds. Thus, cotton became a viable cash crop that cultivators could 96
sow during the summertime when farms remained fallow. 
 The Administer of the Agricultural Development Scheme, Mr. Garbett, was in charge of 
all military cultivation undertaken through 1918. The ADS imported irrigation pumps to reverse 
the impacts of long-term drought which had befallen the region in 1915. This was originally 
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administered by Captain R. Thomas who was sent by the India Office in the capacity of Cotton 
Expert to the Administrative Authorities in Mesopotamia. He created an experimental farm under 
the supervision of the military and implemented of a large commercial production scheme. Most 
importantly, Thomas conducted experiments with various types of cotton to ascertain which 
yields were best, concluding the seed “Webber 49” produced the best cotton. The crop was 
renamed to Mesopotamian White or “Mesowhite” for short.  By 1919, the British Cotton 97
Growing Association secured leases from A.T. Wilson to continue cotton production with the 
conditions that the BCGA would gin, bale, and market the crop as well. In order to achieve 
commercial levels of quality cotton, the council of the BCGA created a cotton-gin plant outfitted 
with new pneumatic presses and machinery that could spin up to six-thousand cotton bales 
annually.  Between the years 1921-24, cotton production rose from sixty bales to over 2,500 and 98
nearly all production was overseen by the BCGA.  99
 In 1919, the Agriculture Department transferred from the War Office to the Revenue 
Department - advantageous for several reasons. Throughout 1918 and 1919, British revenue 
officers carefully catalogued and archived the returns derived from duties and taxes as a way of 
monitoring the population. Individuals whom the British suspected to be sympathetic to Turkey 
had their lands sequestered. This prevented any undue remittances from reaching Turkish hands 
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while ensuring production was maintained and thus revenue.  Ultimately, the Mandate 100
government saw revenue obtained through crop shares as an “outward and visible sign of the 
Arabs’ alleged submission. Payment of revenue is considered the measure of allegiance.”  101
Unfortunately, some tax officials abused their authority by bullying weaker farmers to a tax they 
truthfully could not afford.  102
 The Revenue Department served another purpose. Many inhabitants worked for the 
aghas, pashas, and sheikhs who could afford to purchase land but tribes dominated the rest of the 
country. Farmers composed a semi-nomadic feudal class that was greatly scorned by Bedouin 
tribes. Tribes were typically more powerful than the settled communities of the north, with 
exception of Baghdadis, many of whom served as bureaucrats and were loyal to the Ottomans 
before the British Mandate.  Thus, the Revenue Department was an organization that could 103
illuminate the social construct of Iraq, “…which is so closely inter-related with the agrarian that 
the one cannot be understood without studying the other. Thus, the tribal system as we find it in 
Mesopotamia, that is to say, settled or half-settled agricultural communities, rests at bottom upon 
an economic basis controlled by agrarian conditions.”  If the British could successfully develop 104
an agrarian society and increase the amount of landed peasants, Iraq could be governed more 
smoothly. 
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 But agriculture was not Mesopotamia’s only resource as the evolving objectives of the 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary force reflects. By March, 1917, a year after the demoralizing loss 
of the Kut garrison to the Turks, General Maude captured Baghdad along with the Berlin-
Baghdad railhead.  Afterwards in a telegram, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, William 105
Robertson, reiterated the goals to Maude’s replacement, Lieutenant-General William Marshall as: 
“the establishment and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad wilayat” and “the 
protection of the pipe lines and oilfields in the vicinity of the Karun river.”  106
 Despite the War Office’s orders to Marshall, the extent that oil dictated initial British 
policy in Iraq is debatable - particularly before 1918 and the end of the India Expeditionary 
Force (I.E.F. D). The Indian government was not interested in protecting Persian oil fields in 
Abadan, confirming in 1914 if a British Petroleum agreement “contains [any] provisions 
imposing further responsibilities on the Government of India.  While the British understood the 107
strategic importance of oil, particularly in the northern province of Mosul near Hit and Khaniqin, 
many officials in the Foreign Office believed it penultimate to agricultural production.  The 108
emphasis on oil, or lack thereof, is summarily made by political officer C.J. Edmonds, who 
managed the region of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniyah in the 1920’s:  
 Although the world press was wont to represent the battle as part of a gigantic struggle   
 for the control of oil it is interesting to look back and recall how very little oil figured in   
 our calculations, at my level at any rate; I do not remember a single document in which   
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 oil was mentioned as a factor of outstanding importance, as distinct from the general   
 pattern of trade, both import and export, which made the three wilayats a single and   
 indivisible economic unit.  109!
Doubts remained high, first because nobody knew how much oil existed; second, they would 
have to invest incredible amounts of capital to extract it; third, the British would have to install 
an oil pipeline stretching five-hundred miles through northern Iraq and secure it.  As such, the 110
Civil Administration was hard pressed for resources and continually ran cash-deficits. The 
budget deficit was Rs. 45,135,407 for the fiscal year of 1920-21.  In the wake of the Great War, 111
English taxpayers were still financing an Iraqi campaign that was increasingly unpopular. If the 
British were to address their financial plight, they would have to hedge their future on cash crops 
like dates and cotton. Former Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson was so confident in the 
ability of agriculture, he still believed in 1925 that the British and Iraqi governments would 
derive more revenue from wheat production than oil.   112
 But this did not prevent attempts by the British to exploit Iraq’s natural resources. The 
Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited was converted to Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited in 
March of 1925 and the Deutche Bank conceded its German holdings in the company. The Ango-
Persian Oil Company (APOC), Americans, Dutch, and French, split a £3,000,000 investment 
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equally with each party jointly owning a 23.75% share.  However, full agreement regarding the 113
rates, areas of concessions (APOC had lands independent of their holdings in Iraq Petroleum 
Company), and location of the the pipeline remained in negotiation until a supplemental oil 
agreement was finalized in March of 1931. France wanted the oil pipeline in French-controlled 
Syria while British stakeholders believed a more expensive line from Palestine to Haifa would be 
easier to protect from Bedouin raids.  Therefore, the securitization of the Mosul wilayet 114
depended on oil concessions made later in the campaign. Consequently security remained in flux 
throughout the nineteen-twenties, treated throughout British records as “the Mosul Question.”  115
Where cultural imagination influenced agricultural policy representing the innate, natural, and 
quasi-historical attributes of Mesopotamia and its Biblical past, oil came to symbolize Britain’s 
technological prowess and increasing reliance during the second half of the mandate period. 
 Trains, Planes, and Automobiles - Iraq as a Throughfare 
 The strategic importance of the Suez Canal can not be understated as it was the primary 
passage from which the British could reach India. However, air routes began to challenge the 
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historical and strategic monopoly of maritime passages. As the British weened themselves from 
the restrictive nature of steam power in favor of oil, cities such as Basra and Mosul began to 
exhibit strategic importance apart from their proximity to India. The Mesopotamia Expeditionary 
Force’s primary objective had been blocking Turkish control of Iraq’s only port and the broader 
water basin that forms at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.  116
 Throughout MEF campaign, military planners were less concerned with utilizing aircraft. 
The lack of a concise objective for the first two years, interagency and government competition 
for control, and general lack of foresight from British command, created immense disfunction 
and disorganization through 1916. For example, the Foreign Office guarded its role negotiating 
with the Ottoman Porte, even withholding information from London and the India Office as was 
the case during the Baghdad Railway discussions.  Meanwhile, dysentery, disease, and heat-117
stroke plagued Indian and British troops who were ill-equipped and suffered the brunt of 
administrative ineptitude. Colonial administration understood a schematic and technological 
overhaul was sorely needed. Many of the naval vessels were too large or heavy to travel 
upstream towards forward developments and the port of Basra was so congested that some ships 
waited six-weeks to unload their cargo.   118
 The Indian Administration was the first to respond by sending shallow-hulled ships to 
navigate the channels of the Tigris and Euphrates. Attempting to redeem their catastrophic  
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campaign at Kut, Indian nationalists were always eager to export their technocratic 
imperialism.   However, many of them were poorly constructed or cheaply outfitted boats that  120
were piloted by inexperienced captains. George Buchanan took control of the Basra’s 
reorganization, and slowly, with many bumps and bruises along the way, Buchanan used his  
port expertise to establish a sense of order in the Basra wilayet. In addition to increasing numbers 
of properly outfitted medical supply ships and the number of tugs and steamers, the campaign 
received newly developed weaponry - mortars, machine guns, and hand grenades - items that 
would give the MEF a technological edge over their Turkish opponents.  121
 A complex array of political, economic, budgetary, and technological factors, formed the 
foundations of British maintenance throughout Mesopotamia. These variables were not stagnant, 
but rather evolved and were in constant renegotiation with one another. Thus, aerial schemes and  
policing methods cannot be seen as independent or derived purely from military concerns, but 
rather the result of an equation which remained fluid until the British mandate ended. 
 Of course, the British colonialists developed rail and motor routes in conjunction with its 
air-routes. After the First World War, London had extravagant ideas about connecting the entire 
empire regardless of vehicular method. German presence in North Africa had ceased thereby 
creating a marvelous opportunity for the British to take advantage of their presence. Cairo was to 
become the Empire’s transit centerpiece with rail, road, and ferryboat routes sprouting (or at least 
proposed) frequently.  These modes of transportation created a complex network of routes 122
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heading south towards Cape Town. Eight-hundred miles of water ways connected the north and 
south, and twelve-hundred miles of road.  More routes headed east towards Beirut, Damascus, 123
and eventually Baghdad. If Cairo was an important transportation node that connected London 
with Africa, Baghdad would become the link that united India and Australia. 
 The first blueprints for an overland route connecting the Mediterranean to the Persian 
Gulf had been designed as early as 1835 by Sir Colonel Francis Radwan Chesney. Palmerston 
financed the route in 1836, thinking Mehemet Ali’s control of Egypt and SyriaHe had proposed a 
route going from Alexandria to Aleppo, down the east bank of the Euphrates and towards 
Kuwait.  Willcocks echoed the need throughout his agricultural reports. If crop production 124
increased, farmers would have to transfer their goods to international markets.     125
 Germany had also understood the strategic importance of Mesopotamia and for several 
years developed a railway line from Constantinople to Baghdad. In 1888 the Deutsche Bank 
secured the trust of the Porte allowing the Anatolian Railway Company to obtain a concession to 
construct the railway.  Besides its economic advantages, train would allow the rapid transport 126
of German and Ottoman troops east to Persia and south to the port of Basra. Prior to World War 
I, the German built Baghdadi railway had created incredible angst for military strategists. This 
fear was part and parcel of greater British misgivings toward European encroachment near its 
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Indian doorstep. It even aided the Ottomans to quell rebellions in distant parts of the empire.  127
By 1919, over nine-hundred miles of railway connected Mesopotamia, most of that between the 
Basra-Baghdad-Khaniqin line (most built by the Germans).  128
 Domestic routes were vital for farmers to transfer crops to Iraq’s metropolises. Air 
Minister Lord Thomson emphasized the importance of creating railway in addition to air routes. 
He underscored the necessity to connect Constantinople to Baghdad and Basra, in order for 
commercial goods and connections to be further maintained with Western India.  Because the 129
British continued to develop Iraq’s railways, two systems predominated - meter gauge and 
standard gauge. Meter gauge ran from the north to Basra, composing a primary trunk line. 
Several lines branched from this trunk toward Karbala and Nasariyah, yet these variances created 
logistical problems for the British.  130
 However, the commercial and economic feasibility of rail was questionable. In order for 
any commercial route to work, whether it be air, road, or rail, there must be markets to support 
them. Installing railways was expensive and would have to traverse the Zagros mountains of 
Western Persia to reach India. At the end of the war the railway systems in Mesopotamia were 
valued at three million pounds. After years of improvements and extensions, the entire system  
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Nairn Transport Company at Rutbah Wells Fort, 1937, Anbar Governorate  131
was only worth one million pounds because of the market and difficulties sustaining the line. 
Profits were not high enough to cover depreciation, never mind its protraction.  132
Major Van Ness proposed light-rail alternatives outside the primary trunk line. They would be 
more commercially sustainable and their smaller gauge tracks could navigate mountainous  
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regions more easily.  Despite the use of smaller gauge tracks, portions of the Zagros were still 134
too treacherous for rail, particularly in parts of central Kurdistan near the cities  
of Rowanduz and Rania. Thus, the British relied primarily on automobiles and aircraft to traverse 
the eastern steppes.   135
The Curious Case of Rutbah Wells and the Cairo-Baghdad Air Route !
 Rutbah Wells exemplifies the conjoined efforts to network Mesopotamia by road and air. 
Other roads became important arteries linking Baghdad to Persia, and thus India. The Nairn 
Transport Company was famous for its pioneering services across the region.  Nairn owned an 136
outfit of plush Cadillacs and Fords to make trips comfortable. It made some of the first journeys 
by automobile across the Syrian Desert and mostly transported along the route of Beirut-
Damascus-and Baghdad. East of Baghdad, more roads connected Mesopotamia to Persia. Before 
the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian transport companies were active throughout northern Iran and 
and the Brits continued road construction to Shiraz and Bandar Abbas.   137
 June of 1915 marked the beginnings of the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia which 
had, “started life with two obsolete Maurice Farmans sent down from Egypt only a few weeks 
before. Both had been assembled in time to reconnoitre over Qurna during Gorringe’s advance at 
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the end of May, but one of them, which was constantly having engine trouble, was lost 
subsequently during the Nasiriyeh operations. Two Caudron aircraft replaced them but were 
hardly much better. Maurice Farmans were troublesome aircraft that needed constant repairs, 
difficult to perform when there were few mechanics and even fewer spare parts. Both planes and 
pilots were unaccustomed to flying in tropical weather.  
 The large geographic discrepancies of Iraq created numerous performance problems for 
the RAF. Aircraft technology was still in its infancy, and Mesopotamia’s climate offered a wide 
range of mechanical challenges. Dust and debris was always a concern, but so too were the galls 
sweeping in from the Hakkiari Mountains of Southern Kurdistan. The sweltering summers could 
reach one hundred and twenty degrees or more for extensive periods of time. Person and 
machine became overheated and rudimentary radiators had to be improvised until tropical 
radiators arrived from England.  The arrival of Martinsyde Scouts marked a shift in aircraft 138
technology. They were considerably more powerful than Maurice Farmans despite their meager 
eighty-horsepower.  139
 It was during the spring and summer of 1916 that another fundamental shift occurred.  To 
the instigation of Lt.-General Sir Percy Lakes, the War Office appointed Maude to take command 
of the campaign. Maude rose fast through the military chain of command, developing a 
reputation his efficiency and attention to detail. In addition, he saw the value of aircraft and made 
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a point to fly rather than drive.   In March of 1917, Royal Air Corps tried to bomb the 140
Baghdad-Samarrah railway, pilots landing their planes while explosive charges were attempted 
to be set on the train tracks (T.E. Lawrence was famous for such hollywood antics). 
 If the RGS and RCAS were at the forefront of imperial strategy, the creation of air routes 
and the general use of aircraft were, perhaps, the most prominent conversation topics. Aircraft 
equipped the empire with newfound degrees of communication and transportation while 
exemplifying the technological supremacy of the British Empire. Aerial archeology and 
newfound cartographic methods documented humanity’s land and timescapes as never before. 
Speaking at the RGS (with inaugural Secretary of State for Air Winston Churchill in attendance), 
Control General of Civil Aviation and Major General Sir Frederick H. Sykes, who was a leading 
visionary and developer of imperial air routes, recognized the, “strange sequence of events 
whereby the problem of flight was solved just in time to assist in the conduct of war…”   141
Concerning the ascendancy of aircraft, Sykes quotes himself: 
 The navies of the world will have to relinquish their present proud position; their rôle is   
 that of a floating defence. The Air Service built up on join Army, Navy, and Civilian   
 foundations is in the foremost line. Fortresses, arsenals, dockyards, Government offices,   
 factories of war material, are protected from the air…  142!
As Sykes openly admits, the emergence aerial dominance during the First World War and the 
preliminary Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force empowered British administrators to clear a 
causeway for innovative statecraft; The minds of Britain’s colonial architects, scattered  
!
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“Weeding the Aerodrome”  143
throughout Arabia, forged policies that matched the developments of the modern in abstraction 
and novelty. Before the space age there was the plane age, and Britain was in the driver’s seat. 
 Strictly speaking, Britain was not located marvelously in the center of its empire; 
however, more broadly, the geographic conveniences enjoyed by the empire-at-large was 
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unparalleled. With England controlling Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, it could reach anyplace 
on earth by establishing wireless communication and fuel stations throughout its territory.  
 Thus, both the Levant and Mesopotamia became vital links of communication, not 
necessarily exhibiting value on their own but rather as thoroughfares. Such conceptions fueled 
British desires to equip Cairo with “an Empire aerial organization,” thus, “endeavouring to urge 
forward the latest development of our Western civilization in the new territory.”  In the same 144
lecture, the Captain P. D. Aceland praises the efforts to develop commercial aircraft, partially 
through the modification of warplanes such as the Vickers-Vimy, a heavy-bombing machine that  
evolved into a civilian cargo and transport plane. While Frederick Sykes understood the wartime 
advantages of imperial air routes, he understood the importance and probable usurpation of 
military interests with civil. 
 The Royal Air Force continued to reify the strategic importance of Iraq throughout their 
imperial campaign throughout the 1920’s. “The Cairo-Baghdad air route represents the first fruits 
of this policy, maintains air lines of communication between the garrisons of Egypt, Palestine, 
Trans-Jordania and Iraq, and constitutes an essential link in a chain which is hoped will in the 
future prove capable of extension first to India, and ultimately [?] via Singapore”  Air-routes 145
would connect the entire British Empire and even Australia, London to Melbourne becoming a 
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five-day journey; in comparison, the journey from Baghdad to Basra by steamboat took a 
week.  146
 Of the eight hundred and thirty-three miles that formed the Cairo-Baghdadi air route, 
planes crossed four hundred and sixty-seven of these over the Arabian Desert. It was the first 
stage of an air route that would continue to India and then Australia, thus connecting the entire 
British Empire while simultaneously improving communication. Air-Commodore Brooke-
Popham lectured on the emerging strategic importance of the air route, “Normally, a letter going 
from London to Bagdad travels via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, Bombay, Karachi, the Persian 
Gulf, and Basra, and takes between five and six weeks, thus making Iraq, from the point of view 
of communication one of the furthest outposts of the Empire. The air route is altering all of this. I 
have seen in Baghdad a London paper only nine days old. A pilot has arrived in Baghdad eight 
and a half hours after leaving Cairo…A regular fortnightly mails service is now running in each 
direction.”  147
 The creation of an air-route is more difficult than flying from one location to another. 
While aircraft technology had drastically improved since during the First World War, planes still 
waylaid at aerodromes to refuel. Sir Francis Younghusband asserted that the RGS would 
endeavor to locate the next “Liverpools” and “Portsmouths,” those places that served as the 
“docks and ports” of the air service, throughout the empire.  Thus in 1919, surveyors from the 148
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RAF struck across the desert in Ford motorcades to locate suitable landing locations across the 
desert. Each runway was located forty miles equidistant from the next, serving as stoppage points 
for planes flying to Baghdad from Cairo or Damascus. 
 In the Anbar province the British created a strategic refilling station at the site of Rutbah, 
more commonly known as “Rutbah Wells” because of its oil. Heading West, it was the last 
sizable town suitable for British transportation to resupply. In fact, during the American invasion 
in 2003, Major Gavrilis located the police station at Rutbah, which had been built by the British 
in 1927 and subsequently used as company headquarters during throughout operations in 
2003.  The land and air routes coincided with one another from Baghdad to Rutbah, where 149
automobiles and planes could conveniently land and refill “every twenty to twenty-five miles.” 
At Rutbah, the routes diverge - cars continuing to Damascus and planes toward Amman and 
Cairo. Regarding its potential, Lord Thomson lectured at the Royal Central Asian Society, “I 
believe that route has got infinite possibilities. I would early like to develop it, because it seems 
to have so much importance for the whole of our position in India.”   150
 Mesopotamia’s evolution as a breadbasket and thoroughfare to India was not a 
coincidence but a reflection of the growing needs and desires of the English empire. Cash-
strapped and beset with the responsibilities of other territories, the British imagined immense 
promise for Iraq as a self-sustaining territory - as long as efforts were maintained to manage the 
rivers and irrigation so wheat and cotton could flourish. But discipline comes in many forms. 
Surely, the Revenue Department could catalogue taxes and attempt to settle roving recalcitrant 
!60
 Gavrilis, James A. "The Mayor of Ar Rutbah." Foreign Policy, 20 Oct. 2009. Web. 22 Feb. 2015149
 Thomson, Lord. "My Impressions of a Tour in ‘Iraq." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 12.3 150
(1925): 218. Print.
tribes with the prospect of wealth, but imperial transportation routes, particularly air, held other 
advantages. For Britain’s wrath came swift and sure on the wings of a Vickers-Vimy. 
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Technology as Discipline: Humanity of Aircraft and Shaikh Mahmoud 
We are safe, except for risk of engine failure, for there are no enemy aircraft. But two of us,  
in the only other Maurice Farman, have recently crashed in front of the Turkish trenches,  
and are now prisoners, leaving Jumbo and me and the Flight Commander as young gods on 
whom Fate depends. To us three, and only to us, the past, present and future of this country is 
spread out like a map each morning.  151!
 British imaginations of Mesopotamia as Eden or El Dorado, reified by a multiplicity of 
travel literature, archeological digs, and geographic societies, formed the first half of a violent 
dialectic that granted divine right and responsibility to the British. If resurrection was to be 
achieved through development and modernism, tending and cultivation would be achieved 
through airplanes. Therefore, the value of the plane was not restricted to its physical abilities to 
discipline a population. Planes were physical manifestations of the British colonial project, flying 
articulations of the modern that sanctioned violence against the primitive. They were the latest 
mechanisms to embody the narrative of English supremacy and the latest conversation topics in 
British high society.   152
Negotiations - An Aerial Defense Scheme Takes Shape 
 Despite, Gertrude Bell’s warnings of rising nationalism throughout Mesopotamia, High 
Commissioner A.T. Wilson overestimated popular support for the British. Tribes were becoming 
discontent with London’s patronizing attitude, colonial policy, and taxes. In a letter to Percy Cox, 
Gertrude Bell mentioned the failure of British administrators to create a concise political 
objective in Mesopotamia by 1916, “The real difficulty here is that we don’t know exactly what 
we intend to do in this country. Can you persuade people to take your side when you are not sure 
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in the end whether you’ll be there to take theirs?”  Undoubtedly, British interest in 153
Mesopotamia is best described as commercial and strategic. The MEF’s deployment and 
continued expansion northward towards the Turkish border convoluted these aims. 
 Under Ottoman rule, Iraqis certainly had a history of semi self-governance. T.E. 
Lawrence noted that under Turkish rule, seventy percent of the administration was composed of 
Iraqis while sixty percent of the officers of the Army corps were Arab. In comparison the Civil 
Administration during the Mandate did not have a single local in its employment.  Frustration 154
boiled over and In May, 1920, joint Shi’a-Sunni demonstrations commenced by conducting the 
mawlud and ta’ziyya together, an historic moment representing the materialization of a united 
Shi’i-Sunni front against the colonial forces.  Many of its leaders were former officers or 155
officials in the Ottoman army and administration. Displays of solidarity developed into open 
rebellion and the Revolt of 1920, which began in Karbala and Najaf, spread through southern 
Iraq and Kurdistan. The British estimated over 131,000 rebels were armed and as many as 
17,000 had modern repeating rifles.  It was the first time the region experienced large scale 156
aerial bombardment; in total, pilots flew 4,008 mission hours, fired 183,861 rounds, and dropped 
97 tons of bombs.  While the rebellion failed because of diminishing tribal finances, 157
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divisiveness, and the Royal Air Force, it was a poignant sign that inter-religious and tribal 
barriers were not as formidable as thought.   158
 C.J. Edmonds and E.B. Soane were instrumental in brokering power by providing 
financial and military assistance to amicable tribes.  British policy in Mesopotamia adjusted 159
after the summer revolt and the French expulsion of Faisal in Syria.  The years 1920-22 160
introduced a new phase of British control in Kurdistan as disorder was constantly present at the 
distant periphery of Baghdad. British civil servants tried to forge political alliances with tribes in 
northern Iraq. However, there was a stark difference; Historically, the Ottoman’s tried to weaken 
tribes but the British empowered them. But these arrangements divorced tribal leaders and 
sheikhs from their historical base of power - other townspeople and familial relations.  This 161
also lead the Europeans to depend on continuous technical innovation as tribes came in 
possession of their weapons.  162
 Effectively, Baghdad was too far away from Mosul to maintain security. After six months 
of military action during 1920 London aspired to truncate its operations “to achieve political and 
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military economies.”  In fact, the financial state of Britain was so desperate that London 163
considered a complete withdrawal from Mesopotamia to terminate colonies from hemorrhaging 
its assets. The Cairo Conference responded by establishing new policies that shifted military 
responsibility from the army to the air force - a policy decision the army fiercely resisted. Both 
branches submitted multiple proposals for the future control of Iraq but consensus between 
offices was unattainable as most policy decisions had been.  164
 The RAF and the British Foreign Office in India were amicable to an aerial defense 
scheme but the War Office staunchly resisted. In the wake of postwar debt, the British Empire 
was in dire economic and financial straits and an air enforcement scheme was a preferable albeit 
unconventional alternative. The War Office thoroughly disapproved such plans because its 
generals disregarded any possibility that aircraft could maintain security in Mesopotamia. These 
philosophical differences greatly influenced the modus operandi and proposals submitted by the 
War Staff and RAF. The Air Command schemes were more attractive to the British War Cabinet 
amidst a culture of monetary constraints. Thus, London did not implement a detailed air scheme 
until the end of 1920. 
 While austerity was the initial justification for a military shift, the second reason was 
increased capabilities of aircraft. Planes were highly effect despite pilots and navigators using 
rudimentary tactics during the MEF. Between May of 1916 and the end of the year, the RFC 
grew from five to twenty-four aircraft - mostly models B.E.2c (Blériot Experimental) and 
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Martinsnyde (Snipe and Vickers-Vernon model aircraft replaced them soon thereafter).  165
General Maude greatly valued their presence. Maude led the offensive on Baghdad during 1917 
and used aircraft extensively. During the battle of Kut-al-Amara which began on September 26, 
1917, aircraft dropped twenty-four bombs on a Turkish steamer that had been spotted during the 
night. Lieutenant-General N.A. Marshall’s personal reconnaissance mission is, perhaps, the first 
record of a senior British officer flying during combat.  Maude and his senior staff increasingly 166
relied upon the junior officers of the Royal Flying Corps despite protestations that a single 
squadron of poorly outfitted and antiquated aircraft was not sufficient.  While aircraft were not 167
yet outfitted with wireless capabilities, navigators communicated with ground forces by dropping 
handwritten notes attached to streamers. Such was the case when one plane warned General 
Delamain about the Turkish General Nur-ad-din’s attempt to outflank the British advance on Kut 
during the MEF campaign.   168
 But not everything was positive with airplanes during the 1914 campaign. Radiators 
failed to cool engines and mechanics were forced to improvise until new parts arrived from 
Britain. The Iraqi climate had physically distorted planes designed to fly in England’s more 
temperate climate. The heat and humidity shrank their wooden frames or even disintegrated them 
(Barker notes that 63 Squadron continued flying despite these set backs, conducting air-
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photography and reconnaissance trips for mapmaking).  Since then, RAF aircraft and tactics 169
had improved drastically. Pilots and navigators learned and perfected navigation techniques and 
training drastically improved. For example, when Yeats-Brown arrived from India and reported 
for duty he had no navigational experience. Despite this (and never notifying his superiors), he 
learned the simple codes of communication which consisted of firing red, blue, and white Verey 
lights or flares. These signals communicated the accuracy of artillery strikes to battalions in the 
rear. Bombers learned to glide towards their targets in order to achieve surprise.  There would 170
be fewer limitations if the British could implement a comprehensive aerial scheme of dozen 
squadrons equipped with the newest weapons and best aircraft.  171
 Thus, A.T. Wilson believed the RAF were the best suited force to maintain security in 
Iraq. The performance of Indian and British troops had been underwhelming and loss at the Kut 
still stung. He wrote, “ [the RAF] alone can reinforce Mesopotamia rapidly, and afford adequate 
support to local forces at a distance from the centre in case of need.”  Whatever misgivings 172
London had about implementing an aerial control scheme were quickly assuaged by the promise 
of aircraft during the 1920 rebellion.  If London’s colonial aristocrats needed any more 173
encouragement, they needed little persuading to adopt a defense scheme that exemplified the  
!67
 Barker, A. J. The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-1918. London: Faber and Faber, 1967: 419.169
 Omissi, David E. "Indigenous Responses to Air Policing." In Air Power and Colonial Control:  170
The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, 107-33. Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press, 1990: 
120-21.
 Yeats-Brown, Francis. The artillery commander had strips of cloth with letters L, X, or E 171
communicating the commander’s orders: Observe for line, Observe for range, or repeat last signal” 
respectively, pg. 174.
 Wilson, Arnold T. "Mesopotamia, 1914–1921." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 8,   172
no. 3 (1921): 144-61. 153
 While showing promise, David Omissi how Colonial Administration understated losses and the 173
success of resistance.
The Tigris above Jizre  174
modern era and depicted the racial disparities between the “civilized” Brit and “primordial” 
tribe.  In 1927 for instance, Wing-Commander Norman Bottomley justified the tactics of air 175
policing at the Marlborough School for boys, “the more primitive a race is, the more it respects 
sheer power.”  176
 The consequence of the Cairo Conference was a complete paradigm shift in governance 
and Britain’s aspirations to install a functioning Arab bureaucracy. Feisal would become king and 
maintain relations with Great Britain. While effective administrative governance was still  
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Oak Forest near Rowanduz  177
necessary, a comprehensive governmental scheme with developed institutions would be 
expensive. Thus, the RAF became the highest judicial body - administering swift, clean, and                            
terrible punishment. As predicted, military expenditures declined drastically afterwards. In 1921 
expenses exceeded £23 million. Britain spent a paltry £4 million five years later.  178
 Traditionally, the War Staff was cautious when determining troop estimates. From a 
tactical perspective they desired a plethora of bases spread strategically and evenly across   
territory. In the event of external invasion or uprising these bases could assist and reinforce one 
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another; the scheme’s drawback was its reliance on high troop numbers.  Relations between the 179
Royal Flying Corps (before the RAF became its own branch the RFC reported to the army) and 
War Office had never been pleasant. The RAF and the War Office also disagreed about the 
constitution of threats and their ability to cooperate. Externally, the British were concerned with 
Turkish activity and highly cautious about Russian interventionism in the wake of a Bolshevik 
revolution.  Internally, should tribal factions become unified the British would be severely 180
outnumbered. However, Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff in Baghdad surmised that 
both Kurd and Arab would remain disunited based on information available to the colonial 
administration in 1921.   181
 Preliminary discussions outlined strategic aerodrome locations with respect to physical 
and human geographies. Broadly speaking, British command identified three types of landscapes 
and their suitability for airplanes: “The Plain — an area of cultivation in the neighborhood of the 
rivers, the Desert of the West and South West, and the mountainous country of the North and 
East.”  British Intelligence graded each portion by their ability to be controlled. The 182
Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force formed the foundation of this knowledge. However, the 
movements of the MEF were restricted to areas surrounding Basra and were inadequate to 
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predict the future performance of aircraft which the British had not used until 1917 - one year 
before the MEF’s conclusion.  
 The tall peaks of Iraq’s Northern mountains were disconcerting to strategists from the 
outset of the occupation. Treacherous inclines and ravines cut through ridges decorated by large 
quantities of scrub-oaks, ash, and poplars. Large thickets of willows grew along streams, 
particularly in the southern reaches of the Kurdish mountains. Where trees were absent, dense 
scrub grew abundantly, restricting the movement of individuals or livestock. Officers deemed 
Kurdistan completely inaccessible to all forms of transportation, except for airplanes and 
portions of the Tigris which could be reached upstream by steamboat. The rocky ground created 
complications when identifying suitable aerodrome locations while the mountains discouraged 
pilots from flying at low altitudes, necessary if they were to drop propaganda or bombs. 
Responding to a lecture held by the Royal Society of Central Asia, Sir Arnold Wilson said that, 
“ground conditions in the Middle East are distinctly more unfavorable than atmospheric 
conditions. I am not so afraid when flying of what is in the air as of what is on the ground.”  183
Navigator Yeats-Brown, who had served in the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force was the 
earliest and most famous victim of ground disturbances: 
 Then I saw that our left wing-tip had crashed into a telegraph post. Even so, the    
 full extent of our disaster dawned slowly on me. I could not believe that we had broken   
 something vital. Yet the pilot was sure. The leading edge of the plane was broken. Our   
 flying days were finished. It had been my pilots misfortune far more than his fault that we  
 had crashed. The unexpected smoothness of the landing-ground and a rear wind that no   
 one could have foreseen had brought bout disaster. Nothing could be done. Nothing   
 remained - except to do our job.  184!
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Yeats-Brown and his pilot “Australian” White were subsequently captured by the Shammar 
Arabs and held in Turkish captivity for two years.  Wilson echoed this sentiment at another 185
lecture held by the Royal Central Asian Society: 
 The boundaries of Mesopotamia are almost as difficult to guard as its     
 communications. The boundary-line totals almost 2,000 miles - nowhere does it    
 follow a natural frontier. The high hills and the stony rocks of the desert are a    
 refuge, not an obstacle, to their inhabitants. To the forces of law and order, be they   
 Arab or British, they form an almost impassable barrier. The airplane alone can    
 and does rise triumphant to the occasion, and enables us to attack the denizens of   
 the desert and the hills in their lairs.  186!
Within Iraq’s narrative, the importance of aircraft cannot be understated. “I would say that the 
Air Force in ‘Iraq at the present moment is like the cement in a building which keeps the bricks 
together.”  187
Humanity of Air Policing  188
 The British employed a variety of aerial tactics throughout their tenure in Iraq. Pilots flew 
over tribal territory to passively warn “malcontents” of their displeasure. If they remained 
uncooperative, aviators shot or bombed sheep and cattle herds. Afterwards, they applied intense 
aerial bombardment on towns and villages.  While used throughout Iraq, administrators 189
employed these disciplinary measures extensively in the mountainous regions of Iraqi Kurdistan 
when British presence waned during the 1920’s. 
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 Speaking at the Royal Central Asian Society in 1925, Lord Thomson reminisced about 
the efficacy of an RAF scheme. As Amman was a small indefensible town, the Ikhwan raids of 
1922-24 would have overrun Transjordan had the RAF been unavailable. The aircraft inspired a  
terror too appalling for their calvary. Despite sustaining heavy losses, the Ikhwani calvary would 
have experienced more had it not been for the awesome nature of modern aircraft: 
 No one wishes to glory in it once it has been done; but I think you will agree with  
 me…that unless some such punishment - as swift, as effective, as implacable, and   
 as terrible - had been applied (if humaner and slower methods had been resorted to),  
 the process of restoring order and making people respect frontiers in Arabia would have   
 been long drawn out, and in the end there would have ensued a great deal more suffering   
 to the people, and results would not have been achieved. I am inclined to think that the   
 men who took part in that invasion will never take part in another one.”  190!
Even the self-aware Political Officer of Sulaimaniyah, C.J. Edmonds, echoed the need for 
displays of awesome power to control Kurds, “The Southern Kurd is easily set by the ears and 
will fly before or give in to overwhelming force.”  Such descriptions were commonplace and if 191
not always overt, positioned the Kurd as primitive while simultaneously self-justifying aerial 
policing. These descriptions articulated the Kurd and Arab as sub-human, animalistic even.  192
The tribes were like sheep without a shepherd and the English pilot delivered God’s wrath by 
divine-right. Sir Arthur Harris, who served as leader of 45 Squadron believed the only thing 
Arabs understood was “the heavy hand.” Chairman Viscount Peel, then Secretary of State for 
India and former Under-Secretary of the War and Air Ministry supported Thomson’s sentiment: 
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 I was very much interested to hear - because one has heard it from other members   
 of the Air Force - of the great humanity of bombing. In fact, it was explained so clearly   
 by Lord Thomson that I believe it would even carry conviction to those persons who are   
 suffering themselves from a deluge of bombs.  193!
Stanford historian Priya Satia describes this process beautifully, “Their presence on the ground, 
gathering intelligence that would facilitate accurate bombardment, also convinced some of the 
regime’s humanity.”  Those boasting in the ability of aircraft were quick to advocate the 194
technology as a “moral instrument.”  While accurate precision bombing and advanced targeting 195
systems were still undeveloped, the discourses surrounding aerial police action are eerily similar 
to drone use in the Global South today. 
 The colonialists did not only discipline tribal populations with bombing, but designed an 
articulate air defense scheme that could provide many advantages over an expensive standing 
army. From a secret memorandum that reads like a passage from Michel Foucault’s Discipline 
and Punish, Air Staff wrote the following comments to London:   196
 The speed and range of aircraft makes it practicable to keep a whole country under more   
 or less constant surveillance. Frequent friendly patrols, dropping leaflets containing   
 suitable propaganda, disseminating correct news, and preventing the willful    
 misinterpretation of the orders of a political officer by intriguing headmen, may often   
 prevent the seeds of unrest being sown by irresponsible agitators. It must be remembered   
 that from the ground every in habitant of a village is under the impression that the   
 occupant of an airplane is actually looking at him, and the frequent and perhaps daily   
 appearance of aircraft apparently overhead will do much towards establishing the   
 impression that all their movements are being watched and reported.  197!
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The British prized the ability to maintain continuous or semi-continuous surveillance, a 
newfound dialectic and technological apparatus in response to the nomadic or semi-nomadic  
inhabitants of Iraq.  Intelligence gathering was a two-pronged mechanism administered by the  
RAF which gathered hard intel while simultaneously positioning the tribes as a site of 
discipline.  Ultimately, these hovering threats redefined power relations between Brit and tribe 198
for generations to come.  
 The seeds of a Kurdish rebellion were sown as early as the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919 when the hopes of an independent Kurdish nation were pinned on the sanguine promises of 
British officials. Sherif Pasha had been the Kurdish representative at the conference and was not 
taken seriously despite protesting that the conference neglected questions of self-
determination.   199
 The Lausanne Conference began in November of 1922, where the Turks and Brits 
negotiated the frontier region and control of the Mosul wilayet. Because of diplomatic standoff, 
both sides agreed to exclude the “Mosul Question” from negotiations, agreeing to reconvene in a 
years time. If an agreement could not be made, the League of Nations would determine the 
outcome.  200
 Concurrent with the Lausanne discussions, Turkish troops began concentrating near 
Zakho, a town in the north bordering Turkey and Iraq. Secret pro-Turkish meetings were being 
held among Kurdish leaders who exhibited a lack of trust in the British. In the east, the towns of  
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Koi Sanjaq, Rowandiz, and Ranya composed a strategic triangle near the Persian border but were 
evacuated by the British in August of 1922. Informal Turkish troops led by an individual named 
Ramzi Bey took over the towns until 1925, fighting British troops and Kurdish tribes unwilling 
to submit to Turkish authority.   201
 After August, the British concentrated on bombing the towns composing the the strategic 
triangle around Lake Dukan, particularly Rowandiz. To some degree, the High Commissioner 
was less concerned with Turkish troops inasmuch as the “prestige” lost among the local tribes.   202
Cox recognized that reoccupying Koi Sanjaq would help restore their reputation but meanwhile, 
requested Koi to receive “aerial treatment.”  It was under such political circumstances that the 203
“Kurdish Question” dominated British military and political endeavors for the next two years.  204
Shaikh Mahmud 
 Shaikh Mahmud was arguably the most prominent sadah (affluent Kurdish or Shi’i 
landed class) in southern Kurdistan, certainly in Sulaimaniyyah, throughout the 1920’s until his 
death in 1956.  His father was Shaikh Sa’id of Barzinjah who, along with eighteen others, was 205
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murdered in Mosul in 1909.  He was also a revered religious figure being spiritual leader of the 206
Qadiri brotherhood  and self-proclaimed naqib or decedent of the prophet.  207 208
 He resisted British rule consistently from 1919 and was the largest internal threat to 
British occupation in northeast Iraq.  Relations between Shaikh Mahmud Barzinjah and Britain 209
began in 1919 and were tumultuous from the beginning. In the early years British officials 
attempted to coopt his support hoping they could rule Kurdistan indirectly through the Shaikh. 
Political Officer E.W. Noel had led these efforts. Although Noel was perceived as a brilliant 
political officer, the Civil Administration thought E.B. Soane’s experiences and Machiavellian 
personality would be more successful.  However, in 1919 he took advantage of E.B. Soane’s 210
absence and declared himself King of Kurdistan after imprisoning Soane’s officers. General 
Fraser engaged him in a pitched battle at the Bazyan Pass, where he was found shot in the liver 
by RAF officer C.J. Edmonds.  He was tended and subsequently exiled to Kuwait until his 211
return in 1922.   212
 The British reinstated Mahmud because the frontier became increasingly unstable. Not 
only were Turkish troops being stationed around Rowandiz, the reforms of Riza Khan had 
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rejuvenated the Persian army who recommenced operations against the Shikak tribe, located on 
the Turkish-Persian boundary and led by Isma’il Agha ‘Simko.’  The decision had been 213
controversial but the lack of British troops in Iraq’s Kurdish regions, accentuated by the RAF 
command scheme adopted at the Cairo Conference, left few choices in the minds of British 
administrators.  214
 On September 4th, the British decided to evacuate Sulaimaniyah and Koi Sanjaq due to 
perceived increases of anti-British sentiment spread by Turkish propaganda. Karin Fattah Beg, a 
local Kurdish agha who had recently killed two British officers, was being pursued by a column 
of British and Iraqi levies. With the safety of their forces in question, twenty-six airplanes began 
evacuating forces on the 5th.  Furthermore, tribes such as the Dizai began forgoing taxes or 215
forcing the British to change rates of compensation for produce. In cooperation with armored 
vehicles, Divisional Adviser of Kirkuk, W.A. Lyon responded by leading aerial demonstrations 
through their country.  Ultimately, the evacuation proved a fatal decision as the British never 216
fully reestablished their authority, for they betrayed the loyalty of Sulaimaniyah’s villagers to the 
whims of Shaikh Mahmud.   217
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 He was also a terrifying. When he controlled Sulaimaniyah near the end of 1922 he 
controlled the city and greeted visitors in front of a gallows after any weapons had been 
confiscated. Police monitored potential dissidents including his own brother, Shaikh Qadir, who 
was competing for power and had the loyalty of other less powerful Shaikhs. Few could leave 
the city without permission and others were killed.  218
 Meanwhile, negotiations between A.T. Wilson and Mahmud continued, with political 
officer and Major C.J. Edmonds acting as interlocutor. Both parties exchanged a series of 
telegrams ordering him to come to Baghdad. If he failed to comply with this order, aircraft would 
drop notices over Sulaimaniyah warning residents of an imminent bombing campaign.  
 Near the end of February, Baghdad was getting impatient and wanted to see results. They 
proposed an ultimatum to Mahmud requesting his presence in Baghdad via Kirkuk. The Royal 
Air Force threatened to bomb Sulaimaniyah if the towns leadership, specifically the members of 
the maglis who were reinstated by the British as a concessionary move, did not comply. Bristol 
fighters and Vickers-Vernons demonstrated over the town for several days as a show of force. 
Any damages or injuries incurred by Sulaimaniyah’s inhabitants would lie at the hands of 
Mahmud.  Because Sulaimaniyah’s population was increasingly within British, Turkish, and 219
Kurdish crosshairs, the city’s population dwindled from twenty-thousand to approximately seven 
hundred, refugees fleeing to neighboring towns and cities such as Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Erbil.  220
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 From the beginning, the English had hoped that Mahmud and Simko could cooperate and 
reclaim control from Ramzi Bey who had an estimated two-hundred and fifty troops under his 
command. These efforts proved futile with both Mahmud and Simko unwilling to cooperate with 
each other. Shortly thereafter, the British learned in captured correspondence from Rowanduz 
that Mahmoud’s planned to instigate a revolt against them despite “fervent protestations of 
loyalty.”  The Turks promised Mahmud an independent Kurdistan in exchange for his support. 221
In fact, his brother-in-law, Fattah Efendi, happened to be a former captain in the Turkish Army 
and negotiated on behalf of both parties. When the Lausanne Conference finalized and delayed to 
resolve delineating the frontier region for another year, Shaikh Mahmud took matters into his 
own hands despite the nebulous promises of Kurdish autonomy made by the Turks.  222
 After experiencing a series of bombing raids, Shaikh Mahmud fled to Jasana Caves, a 
region approximately fifty kilometers west of Sulaimaniyah and established his base of 
operations. Jasana provided splendid cover from British bombers, easily resisting their twenty 
pound Cooper bombs.  Over two-hundred troops were located at Jasana, along with another 223
one-hundred at Kamchuga, fifty at Dukhan, and another forty that composed his personal 
retinue.  Former levies who the British recruited and were given machine guns joined the 224
Shaikh. Shaikh Mahmud collected taxes from tobacco and other sources in order to finance their 
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resistance.  This often meant villagers paying tax twice, once to Mahmud and again to the 225
British.  Mahmud even brought a printing press and perhaps began the first nationalist Kurdish 226
publication titled, Bang-i Haqq or The Call of the Truth. The first issue contained a proclamation 
of jihad.  
 In sorties composed of no less than three planes, the RAF attacked his positions with 
several tons of bombs and fired thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition (SAA). Air staff 
reported every quarter-ton of explosive dropped and every bullet fired.  And if the location of 227
the sadah’s troops could not be effectively bombed, pilots turned their attention towards their 
livelihoods: livestock. One such bombing raid was composed of twenty-six planes, which 
dropped exactly 52 one-hundred twelve pound bombs and 184 twenty pound bombs on 
unsuspecting sheep and cattle.  This tactic was developed and frequently used against villages 228
resisting to comply with British authority. Flocks and herds were owned collectively as Kurdish 
aghas let the semi-feudal population raise their sheep or cattle.  Such brutal tactics worked 229
against the Pizhdar,  a powerful tribe located near the Persian border. Initially they supported 230
Mahmud and were bombed. Afterwards, they refused aid in January, 1923 to Shaikh Mahmud 
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and retreating Turkish soldiers.  231
 Such “concerns” with “ethical bombing” is juxtaposed by concurrent operations in the 
city of Sammara. A similar situation was unfolding when malcontent Shaikhs Albu Ali, Albu 
Alga, and Albu Hazazza of Kirkuk, Sammara, and Baqubah respectively, failed to report to their 
mutasarrifs. Pilots dropped messages warning tribes of impending military action if these 
individuals failed to show: 
 As the time in which to give the tribes final warning is short, I am to request that His   
 Excellency the High Commissioner be moved to ask Air Headquarters to have messages   
 too all leaders of these tribes dropped from aeroplaces [sic] on all the encampments lying  
 North of Adhaim on both sides of the Jabbal Hamrin, including Aith.   232!
Iraqi columns would occupy the area and High Commissioner Percy Cox emphasized twice in a 
confidential memorandum to the Ministry of Interior:  
 His Excellency the High Commissioner is not aware of the nature of the military action   
 which it is proposed to take should the tribal leaders concerned not comply with the   
 summons to come in, nor does he wish to criticize the measures which the ‘Iraq    
 Government may take for the preservation of law and order.  233!
Cox effectively granted permission to both the RAF and Iraqi levies to preserve security by any 
means necessary, and was not concerned with the details.  
 At this point, government authority in the Sulaimaniyah liwa was near non-existent. Half-
hazard political allegiances with tribal aghas were used to maintain a semblance of authority in 
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the city. Eventually, Shaikh Mahmud reoccupied the town in July of 1922 after an idle period 
occasionally disturbed by pitched battles and bombings. He remained there with nearly two 
hundred men and continued colluding with the Turks where, “action was taken to attempt to 
bring him to proper perspective.”  Edmonds notes that it was against Mahmud during August 234
1923 that the British first used the newly developed 220 pound bomb.  The RAF was steadily 235
improving its tactics and technology by evaluating performance and testing new methods 
throughout Iraq. 
 Meanwhile, the British continued aerial assaults on the strategic triangle, centering much 
of their effort on the town of Koi Sanjak or Koi. Abbas Mahmud of the Pishdar had supported 
Shaikh Mahmud but “passively” allowed the British to occupy the town after Turkish soldiers 
retreated.  This led to negotiations between Mahmud and the British, aiming to secure the area 236
before winter of 1922. In addition to temporary occupying Koi, Baghdad decided to hire local 
levies and bomb the nearby town of Rowanduz continuously.  A small strike-force composed of 237
one hundred elite British soldiers and local police while Ninjak planes would cover their 
approach Afterwards, the British retreated and Sowar Agha Pirani and his force of local levies 
would act as a deterrent force. Coordinated attacks between ground and air forces became 
normal and illustrates the development of air and ground tactics to work in concert.   238
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 In February of 1923, five Vickers-Vernons of 70 and 45 Squadron two companies of the 
14 Sikhs, which comprised 320 Indian soldiers and two British officers.  This was remarkable 239
for two reasons. The British intended to continue securitizing the North-West Frontier from 
Shaikh Mahmud and Turks in the midst of the Lausanne Conference. Any military victory would 
grant them an edge in negotiations, a strategy that was confirmed within intercepted Turkish 
correspondence.  Shaikh Mahmud was bombed shortly thereafter, fleeing from Sulaimaniyah 240
with two-hundred men and the town’s treasury.  241
 Additionally, this was the first time the British and had transported an entire group of 
soldiers en masse. The conference had begun in November of 1922 and was only finalized nine 
months later in July of 1923. By May of 1923, both the British and Turks were at a standstill. 
Turkish soldiers were still present at Rowanduz and the British continued bombing the town 
unabatedly. Turkey’s southern border was finalized and ceded the rights to Mosul and Shaikh 
Qadir, the rival brother whom Mahmud had attempted to kill, received support and the 
nomination to become a member for the Constituent Assembly of Iraq.   242
Qualifying the Efficacy of Planes 
 A high degree of bravado exists in the memoirs of pilots and administrators. The British 
played God on the throes of aerial and technological advancement. Sir Percy Sykes dictated a 
story at the RGS about the inhabitants of Bandar Abbas, Iran and their first airplane encounter.  
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Flying in Sulaimaniyah Valley  243!
Allegedly, they were so fearful that they fell on their knees and confessed their sins to the pilots, 
believing Judgment Day had arrived.  Furthermore, this chapter’s epigraph points to the sense 244
of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience pilots felt. Colonial administrators subscribed 
to the efficacy of planes to such a degree that they often exaggerated their ability and understated 
the fighting prowess of the Kurds or Arabs: 
 Some months before our visit the activities of a certain sheikh in the neighborhood had   
 been such that the majority of the inhabitants of this town had fled; in fact, the population  
 was reduced to something like seven hundred of the original inhabitants, the remainder   
 were refugees…Eventually action had to be taken against this sheikh. To put it bluntly, he  
 was bombed; he was cleared out, and he is still living as an outlaw in the mountains.  245
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However, Kurdish and Arab forces developed tactics that dampened the effectiveness of planes. 
At this point in history, planes had little or no navigational equipment meaning that pilots flew 
strictly by sight. Villagers quickly learned that pilots rarely flew nighttime sorties and took 
advantage of these shortcomings. Thus, townspeople abandoned villages that became focal 
points for bombing throughout the day and returned at night.  The rocky Northwest Frontier 246
provided the perfect cover for Kurdish scouts who warned villages of an oncoming attacks with 
smoke signals.  And sometimes aircraft proved counterproductive. In a report by the Air Staff 247
in Baghdad, they conceded that it is “unreasonable to expect an enemy to leave his trenches 
while he is actually being bombed and exchange his position for one less safe…”  Thus, the 248
RAF would have to cease bombing operations and allow the enemy to evacuate their tactical 
position. 
 During the Arab and Kurd uprising of 1920, tribes destroyed eight aircraft and severely 
damaged another forty-two, “so badly…they had to be dismantled and rebuilt in the aircraft 
park…”  Ignoring these statistics, a British officer proclaimed in 1923 that tribesmen would 249
preserve their ammunition in the presence of aircraft because they were so difficult to hit.  The 250
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only way to properly describe this claim is fallacious. Examples of tribesmen damaging or 
destroying aircraft are numerous in operation records.  251
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CONCLUSION 
 While much of this thesis addresses historical abstract concepts like Biblicality, 
technological innovation, and other aspects of colonial statecraft more broadly, the consequences 
of such policy permeates the historical (or ahistorical) consciousness of Iraq today. Such were 
my endeavors from the onset of this thesis - to create an historically based project addressing, in 
part, tangible and prevailing realities of Iraq. 
 A series of monumental shifts have occurred in Iraq over the course of writing this thesis. 
The borders drawn by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot remain a defining subtext in 
ISIL’s struggle to establish a modern caliphate. Al-Hayat, the media wing for ISIL, published two 
videos titled, The End of Sykes-Picot and Kasr al-Hudud (its Arabic counterpart).  252
 An important caveat - this thesis does not argue that Iraq’s borders are artificial. In fact, it 
claims quite the opposite. In recent years, news pundits, journalists, and even scholars have 
perpetuated notions of Iraq’s artificiality, arguing that Iraq is the byproduct of both colonial and 
neocolonial forces. There is merit in such notions - to dismiss French, British, and Ottoman 
influence is scholarly fallacy. Indeed, the majority of this thesis highlights the visions of British 
aristocracy and the architects of prestigious societies such as the RGS and RCAS. However, 
political agents have used the myth of artificiality to justify incursions and colonial occupations 
for decades. In fact, these justifications fueled British occupation throughout the Mandate Period, 
providing further recourse for prolonged British influence in light of Iraq’s heterogeneous 
population and geography. In 1932, the same year Iraq gained formal independence, King Faysal 
even made such proclamations: 
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 In my opinion, and I say this with a heart full of sorrow, an Iraqi people does not yet exist in Iraq.  
 There are only throngs of human beings lacking any national consciousness, immersed in  
 religious traditions and falsehoods, disunited, susceptible to evil, inclined towards anarchy, and  
 always prepared to rise up [against] any government whatsoever.  253!
Such sentiment is clearly ahistorical and fails to give agency to pro-Iraqi nationalist parties such 
as Haras al-Istiqlal (Guardians of Independence), Jamyat al-Ahd (Covenant Society), among 
others, who aided the 1920 Arab revolt (Chapter Three). Moreover, this discourse fails to 
acknowledge Britain’s use of Ottoman maps, which were, in fact, based on historical realities. 
Rather, Iraq’s borders are a consequence of prolonged political negotiation, war, and violence 
between a myriad of different state and non-state actors. 
 Perhaps the most salient critique concerning Iraq’s artificiality centers on the inclusion of 
the Mosul governorate.  This is represented by the oft-mentioned phrase, “the Mosul Question” 254
within colonial documents and the subsequent occupation of Mosul several days after the 
Armistice of Mudros. But current narrations fail to posit “the Mosul Question” as an Iraqi-
Turkish issue. Instead, Mosul’s inclusion sparks discussion surrounding the “unnaturalness” of 
Iraqi borders, frequent counter-proposals being a separate ethnocentric state for Mosul, flowing 
West towards Syria. Ironically, both Western pundits and ISIL support this ahistorical and 
fallacious discourse (see aforementioned videos The End of Sykes-Picot and Kasr al-Hudud). 
Anyone traveling to 18th or 19th century Mosul would be struck by its degree of heterogeneity. 
It had been inhabited by Sunni, Shi’i, Chaldeans, Jews, Nestorians, Yezidis, Armenians, 
Catholics, Protestants, Assyrians, Jacobites, and Greek Orthodox groups. In fact, far more Kurds 
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 Other border disputes. Deir ez-Zor to the West in Syria, and recognition of Kuwait in 1991.254
called Mosul home than Arabs.  Both Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein oversaw 255
Arabization policies of the Mosul governorate, which included the city of Kirkuk, attempting to 
gain control of its oil resources.  Thus, new maps of Iraq often divide it ethnographically and 256
are, at best, rooted in spurious historical claims.  
 This research begins its intervention near the end of the 1910’s after the end of World 
War I, a formative period for many places, Iraq not withstanding. Iraq captured British 
consciousness and became the latest symbol of British benevolence, progress, and power. 
Mesopotamia, as it was popularly known, gave Her Majesty’s government another chance to 
prove its clemency in the wake of postwar disillusionment. Reviving the Garden of Eden proved 
the perfect excuse for an aristocracy seeking to diminish German and Ottoman influence while 
simultaneously ensuring a buffer zone for the Empire’s crown jewel, India. 
 Thankfully, the tools to resurrect an Iraqi nation were available in the age of Modernism. 
As the second chapter shows, development was a violent process that was encompassed by racial 
theory and discourse. Rather, development of Iraq was not bred by British altruism but a highly 
complex system seeking to discipline the Nation in a highly Foucaultian manner. For example, 
agricultural reform and the introduction of labor intensive crops such as wheat and cotton would 
generate more revenue while anchoring the unruly and transitive Bedouin tribes. 
 Of course, modern feats of science and engineering provided the Mandate government 
with the means to discipline the countryside less innocuously. Aircraft capabilities had improved 
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drastically throughout the Great War and continued doing so during the British occupation. 
Planes empowered the cash-strapped Brits to establish authority with minimal manpower. As the 
campaign against Shaikh Mahmud in 1924 demonstrates, these aircraft were not primitive but 
highly capable, equipped with a variety of bombs and incendiaries. Airbases spread throughout 
the northern frontier projected British power from Iran to Mosul. These campaigns proved to be 
antecedents for later violations of air sovereignty. In 1923, a pilot named Arthur Harris took 
command of 45 Squadron, which as of February that year, was based in Baghdad with a forward 
detachment in Mosul. He earned the nickname “Bomber” Harris, increasing the multitude of 
raids against recalcitrant tribes in North-West Iraq. He is credited with inventing the heavy 
bomber, supporter of area bombing, and later the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) during the 
Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945.  Indeed, no country’s history is more enmeshed with these 257
birds of prey than Iraq. 
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LOCATION OF SQUADRONS  258
Where squadrons of the Royal Air Force were located as of February 28th, 1923: !
Air HQ, British Forces in Iraq - Baghdad 
HQ Basrah Group - Basrah 
Station Commandant, Hinaidi - Hinaidi, Baghdad 
Iraq Aircraft Depot - Hinaidi, Baghdad 
Wing HQ - Mosul 
No. 1 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul 
No. 6 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Kirkuk 
No. 8 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul 
No. 30 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul 
No. 45 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul 
No. 55 Squadron - Mosul 
No. 70 Squadron - Hinaidi, Baghdad 
No. 84 Squadron - Shaibah 
Stores Depot, RAF - Basrah 
Accounts Office, RAF - Baghdad 
R.E. Services, Iraq - Baghdad 
Rest Camp - Basrah 
RAF Prison - Basrah !
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